Technical change and superstar effects: evidence from the roll-out of television by König, Felix
Technical change and superstar effects: evidence from the roll-out of 
television
LSE Research Online URL for this paper: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/103450/
Version: Published Version
Monograph:
König, Felix (2019) Technical change and superstar effects: evidence from the 
roll-out of television. CEP Discussion Papers. Centre for Economic Performance, 
LSE, London, UK. 
lseresearchonline@lse.ac.uk
https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/ 
Reuse
Items deposited in LSE Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights 
reserved unless indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private 
study, or other acts as permitted by national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights 
holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of the full text version. This is 
indicated by the licence information on the LSE Research Online record for the item.
    
ISSN 2042-2695 
 
 
 
CEP Discussion Paper No 1663 
November 2019 
Technical Change and Superstar Effects: 
Evidence from the Roll-Out of Television 
 
Felix Koenig 
 
 
 
    
Abstract 
"Superstar effects" generate large compensation differentials among similarly talented individuals. Are 
superstar effects amplified by technological innovations that extend the scale over which talent is 
deployed? I test this idea in the market for entertainers, using the roll-out of television as a natural 
experiment which provides clean variation in a scale-related technological change. The launch of a local 
TV station increases top entertainers' incomes, resulting in a twofold increase in top-percentile income 
share, while reducing employment and incomes of lower-level talents. These results show clear 
evidence of superstar effects and are inconsistent with canonical models of skill-biased technological 
change. 
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1 Introduction
Income inequality has risen sharply in recent decades, particularly at the top of the
distribution. In the US, for instance, the income share of the top 1% of earners
increased from about 8% in 1970 to over 20% today. What explains such large income
diﬀerences and why are they growing, particularly at the top of the distribution?
Many economists link such trends to technical change. An inﬂuential literature
has highlighted the role of “skill-biased technical changes” (SBTC) that increase in
the demand for high skilled workers, relative to low skilled workers and potentially
explains part of the 20th-century shifts in the US skill premium.1 An alternative
explanation for rising inequality at the top end focuses on increasing “superstar
eﬀects,” which generate large wage diﬀerences among workers with nearly identical
talent, particularly at the top of the distribution.2 Crucial to the magnitude of such
eﬀects are technologies that expand the scale over which talent is deployed. In recent
years, progress in communication technologies (and other similar technologies) has
increased the potential scale of many productive activities, which plausibly ampliﬁed
superstar eﬀects and thereby generated growth in income at the very top. Recent
studies show a strong correlation of top income growth and rising production scale in
many sectors of the economy.3 Beyond such suggestive evidence, there is, however,
very little empirical work that directly tests whether scale related technical changes
are generating superstar eﬀects.
I use a natural experiment in the entertainment sector to test whether scale-
related technologies amplify superstar eﬀects, and ﬁnd strong evidence for such eﬀects.
Speciﬁcally, I study the roll-out of television stations in the US that sharply expanded
the scale of entertainment shows. Television ﬁlming initially started city by city and
a staggered deployment of TV stations leads to variation in exposure across local
labor markets. I show that the launch of a local TV station increases top entertainers’
incomes, resulting in a twofold increase in top-percentile income share, while reducing
employment and incomes of lower-level talents.
Technological change provides a potentially powerful explanation for recent
changes in inequality, but a lack of exogenous variation in technical change makes
1See, e.g., Bound and Johnson (1992), Katz and Murphy (1992) and the many papers that
followed.
2The superstar theory is developed in Rosen (1981), Tinbergen (1956)
3See work on superstar effects by Gabaix and Landier (2008), Terviö (2008) for CEOs, Garicano
and Hubbard (2009) for lawyers, Célérier and Vallée (2019), Kaplan and Rauh (2010) finance
professionals, and Krueger (2005) for entertainers.
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it diﬃcult to test such eﬀects. Card and DiNardo (2002), Lemieux (2006) famously
stress that recent inequality growth coincided simultaneously with accelerated tech-
nical change and also with reforms to labor market institutions, thereby making
it diﬃcult to isolate the eﬀect of technical change. In the context of SBTC, this
identiﬁcation challenge has been addressed by new research focusing on the impacts
of speciﬁc technologies (Akerman, Gaarder, & Mogstad, 2013; Bartel, Ichniowski,
& Shaw, 2007; Michaels & Graetz, 2018). The objective of my paper is to provide
comparable well-identiﬁed empirical evidence relevant to superstar eﬀects.
The ﬁrst key contribution of the paper is to develop a tractable model of superstar
eﬀects, and derive testable predictions that distinguish such eﬀects from canonical
models of technical change (including SBTC). A well-known cross-sectional prediction
of superstar eﬀects is that small talent diﬀerences become ampliﬁed into large income
diﬀerences, but a test of this prediction requires a credible cardinal measure of talent.
I overcome this challenge by looking at dynamic predictions of a superstar model
– focusing on changes in inequality predicted by the model. I show that superstar
eﬀects are ampliﬁed by a speciﬁc type of technical change, scale-related technical
change (SRTC), which increases market reach. These technologies enable the most
talented workers in the profession, the “superstars,” to attract a greater share of
customers, thereby increasing income concentration at the top. At the same time,
the model predicts falling returns and employment loss at lower talent levels. This
superstar pattern is diﬀerent from a large class of alternative mechanisms, including
canonical SBTC models, where technical change leads to rising labor demand and
rising returns across the talent distribution, proportional income gains and rising
employment.
The second contribution of the paper is to implement a test of the superstar
model in the entertainment sector. The staggered roll-out of television, an obvious
SRTC, provides a near-ideal testing ground for superstar eﬀects within this sector.
Television of course eventually led to a vast increase in the scalability of entertainers’
performances, but this transformation took place in stages. Before TV, entertainers’
performances could typically be watched by only a few hundred individuals in local
venues. When TV was ﬁrst introduced in the US in the 1940s, technical constraints
required television ﬁlming to take place near broadcast antennas, and television
ﬁlming thus occurred in multiple local labor markets. This practice meant that there
were many local TV stars scattered across the US. By the mid-1950s, the introduction
of videotaping led to national scalability of entertainment. Today superstars have a
2
worldwide reach and are among the highest-paid individuals in the economy.4
By using a natural experiment, the city-by-city introduction of TV, I sidestep
two problems faced by the literature on technical change and inequality. A ﬁrst
challenge is that the local availability of technologies is rarely observed directly.
Instead, researchers have to make do with proxies for the technical change (e.g., by
using variation at the industry or occupational level), which makes it diﬃcult to
identify the eﬀect of technical change in the face of spurious trends, for instance
arising from deregulation or pay-setting norms.5 In my setting, by contrast, variation
arises within a given industry across distinct labor markets. To make the TV roll-out
traceable, I geocode locations of TV stations from archival records and then use
this variation in a diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences analysis among local entertainer labor
markets. This approach allows me to control for confounding industry-level time
trends and thus distinguish the eﬀects of technology from confounding aggregate or
industry-speciﬁc trends in deregulation or pay-setting norms. A second challenge
for this literature is the endogenous adoption of technologies.6 Technology adaption
that responds to local labor market conditions creates a simultaneity problem which
complicates eﬀorts to identify causal impacts of the technical innovation. I avoid this
problem by exploiting government deployment rules that generate variation in TV
adoption, independent of local demand shocks.7
I ﬁnd strong evidence for rising superstar eﬀects. With the launch of a TV station,
incomes of top entertainers grow sharply, especially at the very top of the distribution.
As a result, the share of income going to the top 1% nearly doubles. Such gains
arise only at the top of the distribution; mid-level talents, by contrast, lose out. The
results show a decline in the number of mid-paid entertainment jobs and an overall
contraction in employment in the industry by approximately 13%. These demand
shifts are also reﬂected in expenditure records that show a substantial decrease in
4Within the top 0.1% highest-paid Americans, only finance professionals and entrepreneurs receive
higher incomes than entertainers. Despite being a relatively small sector, entertainers contribute
more to top income shares than medical professionals or CEOs of publicly traded companies and
have a similar contribution to engineers. Based on Table 3a & Table 7a of Bakija, Cole, and Heim,
2012 and ExecuComp records on the compensation of CEOs of publicly traded companies.
5Famous proxies for technical change based on occupation or industry variation is presented in,
e.g. Acemoglu and Restrepo (2019), Autor and Dorn (2013), Goos, Manning, and Salomons (2014)
6For endogenous technical change see for instance Acemoglu (1998).
7The government selected locations based on predetermined local characteristics which make the
deployment of TV unresponsive to local demand shocks. In addition, I can evaluate the validity of
this approach by exploiting an unexpected interruption of the TV roll-out, during which several
locations narrowly miss out on planned TV launches. In such nearly-treated places, we see no effects,
adding confidence to the assumption that the roll-out is unrelated to spurious local demand shocks.
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spending at ordinary entertainment events, but increases in audiences and returns
for the most successful shows. In short, scale related technical change has the eﬀect
predicted by superstar theory and moved the industry toward a winner-takes-all
extreme.
Recent research stresses that superstar eﬀects could play an important role in
shaping the modern economy. Such studies suggest that superstar eﬀects could
rationalize the observed shifts in the distribution of earnings, especially as a driver
of rising top income inequality (see, e.g., Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2011; Guellec &
Paunov, 2017; Kaplan & Rauh, 2013), and may also inﬂuence the regional location
of economic activity (Eckert, Ganapati, & Walsh, 2019). These suggestive results
highlight the need for a clearer understanding of SRTC and superstar eﬀects in
the modern economy. Understanding the drivers of income inequality is also highly
relevant for policy-making. Studies on the level and progression of taxes, for instance,
highlight that the appropriate policies depend crucially on understanding the forces
that drive income inequality (Scheuer & Werning, 2017).
2 The Superstar Model
In this section I present a tractable framework to study superstar eﬀects and derive
testable predictions that distinguish such eﬀects from a wide range of alternative
mechanisms. A ﬁrst key ingredient of superstar eﬀects are workers with diﬀerent and
unique levels of talent who are matched with heterogenous tasks. In the context of
entertainment we can think of workers as actors and of tasks as shows. The position in
the distribution is given by the inverse CDF, denoted by pt ≡ P (t > tp) = h(tp) and
ps ≡ P (s > sp) = g(sp), for talent t and show audience size s respectively and I assume
that these distributions are continuous.8 The most talented entertainer is ranked top of
the talent distribution and thus has a value of pt = 0, this rank value increases towards
one . In the production process actors are matched with a stage and the revenue of
a matched pair is given by Y (s, t) with standard properties: Ys > 0, Yt > 0, Ytt < 0.
A second crucial assumption for superstar eﬀects is comparative advantage of more
talented actors in bigger shows (Yst > 0) (see Sattinger, 1975). This assumption
8Continuity is not essential to the model; with jumps in the distribution one actor (or stage)
would be discretely better than the next, which would generate monopoly power and lead to match
specific rents. The exposition here abstracts from this and I return to the topic below.
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leads to positive assortative matching of actors and shows in equilibrium.9
The equilibrium of this model is characterized by three conditions (derived in
Appendix 9.1). These conditions respectively guarantee positive assortative matching,
incentive compatibility and market clearing. Together these conditions pin down the
equilibrium values of wages w(t∗), equilibrium assignment σ(t∗), and output prices
π∗:
pt = ps(σ(t∗)) (1)
w′(t∗) = Yt(σ(t
∗), t∗) (2)
∫ 1
0
h′(t)Y (σ(t), t)dt = D(π∗) (3)
Equation 1 is positive assortative matching (PAM) between actors and shows and
implies that the best actor works on the biggest stage. More generally, the two match
partners are at the same percentiles of their respective size and talent distributions.
Equation 2 is the incentive compatibility (IC) constraint and ensures that there
are no proﬁtable deviations from the assignment in 1. Note that equation 2 holds
that equilibrium wages increases in line with the marginal product of workers. The
equilibrium is therefore perfectly competitive in the sense that there are no match
speciﬁc rents. There is also an implicit participation constraint that ensures that the
lowest wages at percentile p¯ is above the outside options (wres): w(p¯) ≥ wres. For
now assume that this is always satisﬁed and labor supply is thus inelastic. The ﬁnal
condition, equation 3, ensures that demand for talent D(π) equals the total of units
of talent supplied at the equilibrium prices π∗.10
The resulting superstar wage distribution has been the key focus in the literature
and distributional results have been derived for the general case. Here, I will focus on
a closed form solution to illustrate the key mechanics of the model. Assume therefore
that talent t and show size s follow Pareto distributions with shape parameters α
and β for actor talent and show size respectively (pt = t
−
1
α
p and ps = s
−
1
β
p ). A
larger value of the shape parameter implies greater dispersion in the talent and
9Alternatively, papers have a related log-supermodularity assumption and arrive at the same
results. Neither assumption is stronger in the sense that one implies the other.
10We assume that workers supply one unit of labor inelastically, an assumption that is relaxed
below.
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size respectively. Moreover, assume that the production function is Cobb-Douglas
F (s, t) = π
[
s(1−γ)tγ
]φ
, where φ determines the scalability of production (φ > 0)
and γ ǫ (0, 1). These assumptions lead to the wage distribution of the superstar
economy:11
pw = λwp
−
ξ
α (4)
as before pw indicates an inverse percentile, here in the wage distribution. Wages
follow a Pareto distribution, with the shape parameter αξ , where ξ ≡
1
φ
α
γα+(1−γ)β
and scale parameter λ ≡ (γφπ)ξ/α. Notice that the wage distribution looks similar
to the distribution of talent. The shape parameter of the talent distribution is α,
hence wages are more dispersed than talent if ξ < 1. For small values of ξ the
superstar model therefore produces large wage diﬀerences, even if talent diﬀerences
are small. This “talent ampliﬁcation eﬀect” has been the focus of much early literature
on superstar models (e.g. Rosen, 1981; Sattinger, 1975; Tinbergen, 1956).12 It is
however diﬃcult to test this eﬀect because a test would require a cardinal measure
of talent. The lack of objective talent units makes this prediction indistinguishable
from an alternative model without the talent ampliﬁcation eﬀect and extremely rare
talent.
2.1 The Effect of Technical Change
We can however distinguish superstar eﬀects from a wide range of other labor demand
models by looking at the eﬀect of technical change. The distinction becomes visible
during periods of scale related technical change (SRTC), a technical change that
makes production more scalable (φ˜ = κφ with κ > 1). We can see the eﬀect by
looking at the change in the share of jobs with wage w, denoted by ge(w). This change
is derived by diﬀerentiating equation 4 and comparing the resulting distribution
before and after the shift in φ:
ge(w) =
λ˜ξ˜
λξ
w
(κ−1)
κ
ξ
α − 1 (5)
11Condition 1 becomes σ(tˆ) = tˆ
β
α and 2: w′(tˆ) = γφpˆitˆ
( 1
ξ
−1)
. Integrating this wage schedule and
normalizing the constant of integration, or workers’ outside option, to zero we arrive at the wage
distribution in the superstar economy.
12In what follows I focuses on cases where this amplification effect holds. This is the case as long
as large show venues are scarce enough to overcome diminishing returns to scale as we move up in
the distribution (aka if β
α
> 1−γ
γ
).
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where “x˜” indicating new values. Notice that ge(w) is biggest for high values of w,
SRTC thus leads to a growing fraction of top paid actors. This captures the best
known implication of superstar eﬀects: sharp gains at the top of the distribution.
Moreover, such eﬀects are biggest at high values of w and are diminishing as we
move away from the top of the distribution. A second eﬀect operates through the
drop in λ, the shape parameter of the wage distribution. The greater availability of
stars, puts downward pressure on all wages in the distribution by reducing π and
consequently λ and leads to declining share of mid income jobs.13 For non star jobs
this eﬀect outweigh the gains from greater scalability and turns previous mid income
jobs into low paid jobs, in the limit such losses lead to a single superstar that serves
the entire market. The impact of Superstar Eﬀects across the wage distribution are
summarized in Figure 1. High paid jobs emerge at the very top, while growth rates
diminish as we move away from the stars of the profession. Towards the middle of
the distribution mid-income jobs are disappearing as mediocrely talented workers
pay is declining, leading to growing share of workers with low pay. The impact of
superstar eﬀects across the wage distribution is therefore U-shaped. To map this
model to the empirical setting, we additionally want to allow workers to exit the
sector, reﬂecting that the empirical setting studies a partial equilibrium set-up. The
wage in the outside sector is given by wres and workers with wages below this level
leave the sector. This leads to a participation threshold, denote the level of the lowest
participating talent p¯.
The distributional consequences of Superstar Eﬀects can be summarized by four
testable propositions (derived in Appendix 9.3):
Proposition 2.1. Superstar Effects lead to
a) Top wage growth: For two percentiles at the top of the wage distribution p′ > p
the growth rate ge increases as we move up in the distribution: g
p′
e > g
p
e
b) Fractal inequality: For top income shares (sp) at two percentiles p pay differences
increase: s˜1%/s˜10% > s1%/s10%
c) Adverse effects for lesser talents: Employment at mid paid levels declines as
ge < 0 when w → 1
13Notice that if pi is unchanged (ie if demand for entertainment is perfectly inelastic), λ would
rise. I assume that demand is sufficiently elastic (1− ε < (γφpi)κ−1) to rule this case out, for an
alternative approach to generate this result see Rosen, 1981. Even without these cannibalizing
effects, the previous results on relative gains at the top hold. This is for instance the case in Gabaix
and Landier, 2008.
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d) Employment loss: For a given outside option wres and corresponding participa-
tion threshold p¯ superstar effects imply ˜¯p < p¯
The ﬁrst result in a) is disproportionate gains at the top of the income distribution.
The second result in b) focuses on growing income dispersion within the top income
tail and captures that moving up a rank in the talent distribution becomes more
valuable. As a result, a growing proportion of the the income earned by the top
10% is earned by the top 1% and consequently the ratio of the two income shares
(s1%/s10% ↑) increases, also known as growing “fractal inequality”. The third result
in c) highlights that gains at the top come at the expense of other entertainers.
Technical progress allows stars to steal business of lesser talents, leading to falling
demand for such lower talent entertainers. The ﬁnal results in d) captures the winner
takes all nature of superstar eﬀects. Employment falls when the stars’ growing market
reach reduces returns of other workers below the reservation utility and thus pushes
them out of the market.
Such superstar eﬀects are diﬀerent from canonical models of labor demand.
Canonical labor demand models, including SBTC, feature skill groups of perfectly
substitutable workers. Among perfectly substitutable workers the law of one price
limits growth in wage dispersion and makes wage growth proportional to talent, at
odds with results a) and b) above.14 A second distinctive feature of Superstar Eﬀects
are the losses incurred by large parts of the distribution. Caselli and Manning (2019)
show that such losses are at odds with canonical labor demand models, where technical
change shifts labor demand outward and increases both wages and employment, at
odds with the Superstars results c) and d) above.15
In summary, we can distinguish the superstar eﬀects by taking 4 predictions to
the data: a) disproportional wage growth at the top, b) growing pay inequality among
top earners c) decreasing wages for mediocre workers, and d) falling employment.
3 Data and Setting
The entertainment sector in the mid 20th century provides sharp variation in pro-
duction scalability and a rare opportunity to simultaneously observe the locations
14Appendix 9.4 shows these limitations of SBTC and illustrates the extensions that are required
to make the model match superstar effects.
15Models where technical change improves the productivity of capital instead of workers (e.g.
routinization) may lead to wage and employment losses if capital is a substitute for workers.
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of technical change, the resulting shift in market reach and labor market outcomes.
I combine records from archival sources to measure all three and isolate plausibly
exogenous variation to test for superstar eﬀects.
3.1 Production Technology
With the launch of TV in the 1940s and 1950s entertainment shows began to reach
mass audiences. Broadcasting antennas relayed shows via airwaves to households in
the transmission radius. At the time TV sets were not as widely available as today,
nevertheless the audiences of TV shows was substantially bigger then at local live
shows and audiences available to entertainers multiplied. Pioneering TV ﬁlming,
unlike today, was predominantly live and recorded locally near the broadcasting
station. Multiple local stations were therefore ﬁlming TV shows simultaneously
across the country. The fragmentation of ﬁlming was the result of technological
and regulator constraints of the early TV period. Most importantly, the lack of
infrastructure to transmit shows from station to station inhibited relaying the same
shows across the US (see Sterne (1999) for a detailed account). Moreover, recording
technologies were in their infancy and resulted in poor image quality, making them a
poor substitute for local live material.16 Finally, regulation restricted studio locations
and speciﬁed that “the main studio be located in the principal community served”
(FCC annual report 195) and TV ﬁlming thus occurred in places scattered across the
country.
To trace the location of ﬁlming I geocode the location of studios and match them
to local labor markets. Previous studies on television have focused on the other side of
the market, the consumers of TV shows and traced TV signal transmission to test the
eﬀects of watching TV on political and educational outcomes (e.g., Gentzkow, 2006;
Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2008). This study instead digitizes new administrative records
on the location of TV ﬁlming to study changes in labor demand for entertainers.
Moreover, I sharpen the identiﬁcation strategy with novel data on the licensing
process. The data come from archival records of the “Annual Television Factbooks,”
and I compute the number of stations ﬁlming in each US local labor market.17
16Non-local content had to be put on film and shipped to other stations, where a mini film
screening was broadcast live, this was known as “kinescope.”
17I assume that all stations were filming locally at that time. A handful of stations are an
exception and operated a local network. This was rarely feasible because the technical infrastructure
was still in its infancy. In my main specifications I code all members of such networks as treated to
avoid potential endogenous selection of filming locations within the network.
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Figure 2 shows where TV ﬁlming took place in 1949, a year with Census wage data.
Exposure to TV ﬁlming varied substantially across local labor markets, and I exploit
this variation in a diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences analysis.
The key identiﬁcation assumption is that TV launches are unrelated to local
demand shocks. Central to this assumption are the deployment rules of TV stations.
For years when such rules are available archival records lend credibility to this
assumption.18 Administrators drew up lists that ranked locations in terms of priority
and worked through the ranking. Priority is based on pre-determined location
characteristics and thus based on factors that are unresponsive to local demand
shocks. This guards against the most glaring endogeneity concerns from endogenous
adaption. We may however worry that there are more complex spurious links between
the assignment and labor market changes.
An unplanned halt in licensing leads to additional quasi-experimental variation
in TV that allows me to probe if the roll-out is indeed unrelated to local demand
changes. The hold-up gives rise to a group of locations that would have received TV
but narrowly miss out due to the regulator shut-down. I use such blocked locations
to test if the roll-out is related to spurious demand shocks. The principal reason for
the interruption in the roll-out was an error in the FCC’s airwave propagation model.
This model was used to delineate interference-free signal catchment areas, but the
error implied that signal interference occurred among neighboring stations. To avoid
a worsening of the situation, the FCC put all licensing on hold and ordered a review
of the model. Previous studies noted this hold up, but lacked the regulator records
to distinguish locations that were held up by the FCC from late adapters. I collected
new FCC records to distinguish the two groups and Figure 2 shows the aﬀected labor
markets. Licensing only resumed in 1952 and delayed the onset of TV by at least
four years in the held up locations.19
A further attraction of this setting is that we observe the end of local TV ﬁlming.
Local shows are eventually superseded by centralized productions. The Ampex
videotape made shows from outside the local labor market a close substitute for local
live shows and led to the concentration of TV production in two hubs, Los Angeles
and New York and the demise in other locations.20 The videotape was presented
18The target areas were at least 50 miles from the nearest station and in 1952 ordered by 1950
population.
19Initially the freeze was expected to last about a year. However, the review was delayed to ensure
compatibility with arising new transmission technologies (UHF and color transmission).
20This trend was also helped by the contemporaneous roll-out of coaxial cables that allowed
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in 1956 and immediately over 70 videotape recorders were ordered by TV stations
across the country. The same year, CBS started to use the technology, and the other
networks followed suit the next year and thus led to the rapid decline of local ﬁlming.
This removal of local ﬁlming gives rise to another identiﬁcation check and we can
test if the local eﬀects disappear. For this test I control for places where ﬁlming
centralizes and to avoid an endogenous control problem, I use a pre-determined
measure of production costs as control. This variable picks up location incentives
that come from permanent regional characteristics and is based on the share of 1920
movies produced in each local labor market, gathered from records of the “Internet
and Movie Database” (ImDB)
3.2 Labor Market Data
Labor market data come from samples of the of the US Census micro-data ﬁles (1930-
1970). I focus on ﬁve entertainment occupations that beneﬁted from the introduction
of TV: actors, athletes, dancers, musicians and entertainers not elsewhere classiﬁed.
For each of them I compute labor market outcomes for the 722 local labor markets
that span the mainland US.21 The Census ﬁrst collected wage data in 1940 and in
all years asked about the previous year, wages reported in 1940 thus refer to 1939.
Data for the full distribution of wages is reported in 1940, but from 1950 onward top
coding applies. Fortunately, the top code bites above the 99th percentile of the wage
distribution and up to that threshold, detailed analysis of top incomes is possible. A
ﬁrst set of variables looks at entertainers’ position in the US wage distribution. This
follows Chetty, Hendren, Kline, and Saez (2014) in measuring inequality by ranking
entertainers’ wages relative to the overall labor force and thus focuses on a metric
that is scale independent, making comparisons over time easier. This measure also
side-steps top-coding issues, as the share of workers with a wage above a threshold,
say the 99th percentile, can be computed. The share of top paid entertainers, say
those whose wage falls in the top 1% of the US wage distribution (DUS1% = 1), is
thus given by:
p99m,t =
∑
iEi,m,t ·D
US1%
Et
which is simply the ratio of top-earning entertainers in market m at time t and the
number of entertainers in a labor market. One concern with this outcome is that
producers to relay live shows from station to station.
21I follow Autor and Dorn (2013) and define local labor markets based on commuting zones.
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ﬂuctuations in the denominator lead to spurious eﬀects. To address this challenge, I
hold the denominator ﬁxed at the average national level, which turns the division
into a normalization.22 An alternative solution studies outcomes at a per-capita level,
which is also unaﬀected by swings in entertainer employment. I additionally compute
such per capita measures, that use local population as denominator. A further
outcome of interest is the share of income going to top percentiles in entertainment.
To compute such shares I have to take a stance on the pay distribution beyond the top
code. To do this I follow the literature in using Pareto approximations.23 Moreover,
I compute additional outcome measures, including log employment and geographic
mobility of entertainers (see Appendix 10.3 for details).24
3.3 Market Size
The entertainment setting oﬀers a unique opportunity to quantify what market
workers serve. Such data comes from archival records on audiences and revenues of
live and TV shows. For live shows I use the 1921 “Julius Cahn-Gus Hill theatrical
guide,” which aims to provide “complete coverage of performance venues in US cities,
towns and villages.”25 For TV shows I compute the number of TV households in
a station’s signal catchment area using signal data from Fenton and Koenig (2018)
and Census data on TV ownership. Moreover, I collect price information from TV
stations’ “rate cards” and compute the revenue of local shows. TV shows provided
an enormous step-up in the revenue and audience of entertainment shows.26 Live
shows reached on average 1,165 people before TV, while the median TV station
could reach around 75,000 households. To track the group of workers who may
22I normalize by the average number of entertainers in treated labor markets to simplify interpre-
tation of the regression coefficients as percentage point changes. Results without the normalization,
as presented in Appendix 11, are in line with the baseline.
23For top income shares I focus on the larger 350 markets; details are described in Appendix 10.3.
24Note that the definition of mobility varies across Census vintages. Moreover, it does not
distinguish between moves within and across labor markets. Noise in the outcome variable will
inflate standard errors but not necessarily bias the estimates.
25The theatrical guide covers seating capacity and ticket prices of over 3,000 performance venues
that cover ca. 80% of US local labor markets. According to the author “Information has been
sought from every source obtainable - even from the Mayors of each of the cities.” Undoubtedly the
coverage will be imperfect and small or pop-up venues will be missed. Since we focus on star venues
this omission may be of lesser concern. I use the largest available audience in the labor market as
proxy for stars’ show audience. I probe the reliability by manually comparing specific records with
information from archival data and the data seems reliable.
26Details on revenue data are in Appendix 10.3. For TV shows, prices are imputed based on an
demand elasticity estimated in a subset of 451 markets where data is available.
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lose out from TV, I collect information on attendance and spending at county fairs.
The data span revenues and ticket sales for over 4,000 county fairs over 11 years
(1946-1957) and covers the majority of US labor markets. I collect these records from
copies of the “Cavalcade of Fairs,” which is published annually as a supplement to
Billboard magazine and reports detailed records on county fairs. I aggregate local
spending at the regional level and in three spending categories that are diﬀerentially
close substitutes for television: spending on live shows (e.g., grandstand shows), fair
tickets, and carnival items (e.g., candy sales and fair rides). Fair shows most closely
resembled TV shows at the time, while candy sales and fair rides are by nature less
substitutable with TV. Finally, I trace when county fairs faced competition from TV
shows, using data on TV signal from Fenton and Koenig (2018).27 The availability of
TV in 1950 is shown in Figure 3, due to the freeze a number of places had narrowly
missed out on TV signal at this point and the ﬁgure illustrates this variation too.
4 Empirical Results
During the roll-out of TV inequality in entertainer wages increased sharply. The sector
started out far more equal than it is today. Figure 4a shows that before the advent
of TV, most entertainers earned close to average pay, while after the introduction of
TV pay dispersion grew substantially. Between 1939 and 1969 compensation of top
entertainers grew disproportionately, many mid-income jobs had disappeared and a
larger low-paid sector had emerged. At the same time, employment in performance
entertainment remained stable, while it grew quickly in other leisure related activities,
e.g. restaurant and bar workers, fountain workers and sport instructors (Figure
4b).This pattern of rising dispersion in log pay and lack of employment growth is
precisely what superstar eﬀects predict. Yet from these aggregate patterns it is
unclear whether the simultaneous rise of TV is just a coincidence or causing these
eﬀects.
An ideal test of the superstar eﬀects would randomize production technologies
across labor markets. To get close to this ideal, I exploit the staggered introduction
of television across local labor markets (m) over time (t) in a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
regression:
Ymot = αm + δot + γXmt + βTVmt + ǫmot (6)
27Similar TV signal data has been widely used to study the effect of TV watching (e.g. Gentzkow,
2006; Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2008).
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where αm and δot are labor market and occupation-year ﬁxed eﬀects; Xmt is a vector
of time varying labor market characteristics. The treatment variable, TVmt, uses the
newly collected data on the number of local TV stations producing local shows in
a market m at time t. I run the regression at the more disaggregated labor market
(m), year (t), occupation (o) level to control for potential time ﬂuctuations in the
occupation deﬁnition with occupation-year ﬁxed eﬀects. The standard errors ǫm,o,t
are clustered at the local labor market level, so that running the analysis at the
disaggregated level will not artiﬁcially lower standard errors.
The variation in TVmt comes from the staggered deployment of TV stations (See
Section 3 for details). By leveraging regional diﬀerences in exposure to technical
change, the identiﬁcation can hold aggregate eﬀects ﬁxed and thus address trends in
regulation and norms.
4.1 Results: Rising Returns at the Top
First, I test the headline prediction of the Superstar Eﬀect, a sharp increase in
wages at the top of the distribution (see Proposition 2.1a). I implement this test in
the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences analysis in equation 6 and test the response of the top
percentile of entertainer wages to the launch of TV ﬁlming. This compares 546 local
labor markets over time, excluding labor markets that are too small to compute the
top percentile. The results strongly conﬁrm this headline prediction and show a large
and signiﬁcant wage increase at the top. The top wage percentile increases by 14 log
points or approximately 15% (see panel A in Table 1). Next, I check that this eﬀect
is indeed speciﬁc to the entertainment sector and study the position of entertainers
in the US wage distribution. For this I compute the share of entertainers in the top
percentile of the US wage distribution, which is available for the full sample and
compares 722 local labor markets across the mainland US. Panel B in Table 1 shows
that the share of top paid entertainers grows by 4 percentages points and thus nearly
doubles. The results thus conﬁrm that the launch of a TV station leads to a large
and signiﬁcant increase in top incomes in the entertainment sector, both in absolute
and relative terms.28
Superstar eﬀects predicts that the biggest gains from an expansion in market
28One potential concern with the latter approach are fluctuations in the denominator which could
bias the estimates. Recall however that we constructed the variable with this challenge in mind and
are holding the denominator fixed. A related approach uses per capita shares which suffer less from
fluctuations in the denominator. Such estimates yield similar results (panel C of Table 1).
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reach accrue to the most sought-after performers, and I turn to this prediction next.
A ﬁrst challenge for such a test is to get data on who is a popular performer before
the launch of TV. I compute a measure for willingness to pay for entertainers based
on the wage information in the de-anonymized Census data in 1939. I then link this
variable to a measure of later TV success based on the “Who is Who of Television.”
One point in case is “uncle Ed” of Kentucky, who became a local TV star at WAVE
TV. I ﬁnd this local TV celebrity in the 1940 Census and identify his wage before TV
was around. The linked data are a small panel that combines data on the popular
appeal of entertainers before TV to their later TV success. Figure 5 shows the
earnings percentiles of TV stars prior to the launch of TV. This reveals that the vast
majority of TV stars were in the top tail of the entertainer wage distribution even
before TV. The successful TV stars are thus the stars of the pre-TV era, and TV
indeed ampliﬁes the most successful entertainers.
Probing the Identification Assumption
The key identiﬁcation assumption is that TV launch dates are unrelated to local
trends. One piece of support for this assumption is that government documents
show that locations are selected based on pre-determined local characteristics and
the roll-out thus does not respond to local economic conditions. The 1952 “Final
Allocation Report” for instance prioritizes locations by their local population in 1950.
We can condition on such pre-determined local characteristics and then exploit the
fact that approvals arise quasi-randomly from administrators working through the
stack of priorities over time. To further verify that the timing of approval is unrelated
to local trends I ﬁrst control directly for time-varying changes in local labor markets.
I run two speciﬁcations, one controlling for time varying local characteristics and
one that allows for local labor market speciﬁc trends (column 2 and 3 in Table 1).
The second approach adds more than 700 additional location speciﬁc trends and
thus is a very demanding speciﬁcation, standard errors increase accordingly. Both
speciﬁcations ﬁnd eﬀects very similar to the baseline, indicating that diﬀerential local
trends are not driving the ﬁndings.
To probe this assumption further, I run a placebo test with TV launches that
are unexpectedly blocked. In addition to previous tests, this allows me to test if
there are demand shocks that coincide with the launch of television. Recall that
the interruption was a blanket freeze that put all license procedures on hold. For
identiﬁcation this indiscriminate approach is useful as it generates variation that is
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independent of local economic conditions. Figure 6 shows the impact of the freeze on
TV launches and shows the sudden halt in approvals. I use this sudden stop and test
for spurious eﬀects in labor markets that narrowly miss out on TV. This placebo test
compares blocked to untreated labor markets in a dynamic diﬀerence in diﬀerences
regression with blocked stations (TV blockedmt ) as treatment:
Ymot = αm + δot + γXmt +
∑
t
βtTV
blocked
mt + ǫmot (7)
The eﬀect of blocked stations is captured by βt and is depicted in Figure 7a. The
results show no eﬀect in blocked locations and thus conﬁrm that trends in blocked
and untreated areas evolve in parallel. The TV roll-out therefore appears to unfold
orthogonally to local demand shocks, shoring up conﬁdence in the identiﬁcation
assumption of the above results. This test is arguably more convincing than a
pre-trend test or a test based on placebo occupations, as we can test for local shocks
in the same occupations and year. For completeness, I perform those additional
robustness checks and they show the same result (Appendix 10.2.3).
Finally, I show that the treatment eﬀects only last while local ﬁlming is the
predominant practice. With the advent of the videotape, when national ﬁlming takes
over, the local eﬀects disappear (Figure 7b). I capture the eﬀect on the newly emerging
hubs, by including a pre-determined proxy for local ﬁlming cost, interacted with the
period after the launch of the videotape. In this period without location constraints
on ﬁlming, places with a comparative advantage in ﬁlming see fast top income growth.
The remainder of previous ﬁlming centers, however, experience a striking decline and
the diﬀerence between such places and the control areas disappears. This rise and
subsequent disappearance of the eﬀects conﬁrms that the results are driven by TV,
rather than by diverging local trends. In 1969 the diﬀerences between treatment and
control group reverted to the pre-treatment level, suggesting that the common trend
assumption holds.29
Links Between Markets
So far the analysis focused on changes in inequality. For the interpretation of the
results, it will be useful to distinguish between two potential mechanisms: migration
of entertainers and changing returns to talent. I therefore directly examine the
29Notice that this test is a powerful parallel trend check that leverages both pre and post TV
periods for a parallel trend check. A conventional pre-trend check is reported in Appendix 10.2.2.
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mobility of entertainers across local labor markets.30 Note that labor markets where
entertainers could reach the largest audiences before TV also tend to receive TV
earlier. Such diﬀerences will be absorbed by the location ﬁxed eﬀects and, absent
mobility frictions, we would not expect substantial mobility responses. This friction-
less benchmark may however not hold in practice, so I test the mobility response
empirically. The results indeed show very modest changes in mobility patterns. The
point estimates are in fact negative and conﬁdence intervals are tight and rule out
that mobility increased by more than 2% (columns 1 – 3 of Table 2). Using these
results to bound the impact of migration, such eﬀects can explain at most a quarter
of the total eﬀect, while the central estimates suggest that mobility plays next to
no role in explaining the results. A related test studies mobility across neighboring
labor markets where moving is arguably easiest. Excluding neighbors of treated
areas should thus alleviate mobility eﬀects. Results that exclude neighboring areas
are close to the baseline, indicating again that migration plays a minor role for the
ﬁndings (panel B of Table 2). This suggests that the results mainly capture changes
in labor market returns.
4.2 Distinguishing the Superstar Mechanism
4.2.1 Results: Demand for Non-Stars
Superstar eﬀects move labor market closer to a winner-takes-all market and in the
process leads to falling employment in the industry (proposition 2.1 d)). To test
the employment eﬀects of TV, I study entertainer labor markets where customers
can access TV entertainment and compare entertainer employment in local labor
markets with diﬀerential access to TV signal. Such regressions thus rely on variation
in TV signal rather than TV ﬁlming that was relevant above. The TV signal data is
not available at a channel level, instead I use a dummy for access to TV signal as
regressor. Employment records in the Census are available for additional years, which
allows me to expand the sample period backward by a decade to 1930. Results for
this extended period are reported alongside results for the baseline period. I ﬁnd that
the introduction of TV leads to a substantial fall in local entertainer employment
and I estimate that around 13% of jobs are lost (Table 3 column 1, panel A for the
30Note that panel data, albeit not available, would not separately identify the effect of mobility
and changes in productivity. In the Superstar model mobility affects the assignment of workers to
firms and an individual fixed effect regression would conflate time varying changes in matching with
changes in productivity.
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extended sample and panel B for the baseline sample). This conﬁrms the prediction
of superstar eﬀects and is sharply at odds with models where technical change causes
a positive demand shock, which would raise employment.
Since these speciﬁcations use variation from TV signal rather than from TV
ﬁlming, it is salient to probe the identifying assumption again. As before, results are
robust to the inclusion of controls and local trends (Columns 2 and 3 of Table 3).31
Further, common trend tests suggest that the set-up is valid. A ﬁrst pre-trend test
introduces a lead to the treatment variable in the diﬀerence in diﬀerences regression,
which captures diﬀerential changes in treatment and control areas, right before the
treatment and shows no sign of such diﬀerential trends (Column 4).32 Placebo tests
with stations that did not happen due to the freeze also show no eﬀect (Panel C of
Table 3), adding conﬁdence that there are no spurious trends during the roll-out.
The shift of demand from a profession’s mediocre workers towards its stars should
also be reﬂected in a decline in mid-paid jobs (see Proposition 2.1c). To test for
such eﬀects, consider entertainers who are below the top 90th percentile of the US
wage distribution but still in the upper quartile. These are entertainers who receive
above-average pay but are far from the top of the entertainer distribution. TV has
a signiﬁcantly negative eﬀect on this group, the number of jobs that pay in this
range declines by around 50%. The results look similar between the median and
the 75th percentile (results are reported in Figure 8). Television therefore leads to a
substantial decline in well-paid jobs and makes it substantially worse to be a mediocre
entertainer during the TV era.
The corollary to disappearing mid-paid jobs is the growing low-pay sector. An-
alyzing the share of entertainers paid below the median, we observe a modest rise
in the share of entertainers with wages at the very bottom of the distribution, with
little change in the second quartile. Television thus reduces the payoﬀ of non-star
talent and creates a growing low-pay sector.
4.2.2 Results: Fractal Inequality
A third implication of superstar eﬀects is a widening wage gap between stars and
their slightly less talented peers (see Proposition 2.1b). A non-parametric test of
31Median income is not available in 1930 and controls in the extended sample use the remaining
variables.
32TV signal, unlike local filming, is not removed and we thus cannot rely on pre- and post-periods
to identify counterfactual trends.
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this prediction repeats the baseline diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences regression, focusing on
percentiles just below the star level. Take, for example, entertainers who are below
the top 1% but still among the top 5% of the US wage distribution. I ﬁnd that
television also beneﬁts this group but the eﬀect is only one tenth the size of the eﬀect
at the very top. Television therefore disproportionately beneﬁts the superstars and
widens the pay gap in the top tail of the distribution. To conﬁrm this pattern we
can look at the next lower wage bin, between the 90th and 95th percentile. Here
the eﬀect of television is insigniﬁcant, again conﬁrming that television’s eﬀect fades
quickly as we move away from the top stars in the market. The eﬀect of technology
declines remarkably quickly in the top tail. TV appearances help a small group of
top stars, has moderate eﬀects on backup stars and has no discernible beneﬁt for
other top earners.
The growing fractal inequality is also reﬂected in growing top income dispersion
within entertainment. This is closely related to the previous results but focuses on an
inequality measure widely used in the literature, top income shares.33 Prior to TV,
the fraction of income going to the 1% highest earners in a local labor market was,
on average, 3.8%.34 TV ﬁlming increased the top income share by 3.7 percentage
points thus nearly doubling the income share (Table 4). Proposition 2.1b suggests
that the growth in these shares should escalate toward the top of the distribution.
Indeed, most of the gains in the top 1% accrued to the very highest earners. The
top 0.1% of entertainers saw their income share rise by 2.4%. This group is only one
tenth of the top 1% but accounts for over half of the rise of the top 1% income share.
While the share of income going to the top 1% doubled and the equivalent share of
the top 0.1% grew 4 fold, the top 10% share grew only 30%. A test of equal growth
rates in the top tail is strongly rejected, which aligns with superstar eﬀects where
wage growth is strongest at the very top of the distribution.35
In summary, the eﬀects across the entire distribution of entertainer pay are U-
shaped (Figure 8). At the very top of the distribution TV has a large positive impact,
but such positive eﬀects decline quickly as we move away from the very top, turning
negative below the 90th percentile. At the same time we see a growing low-paid
sector in the industry. This characteristic pattern oﬀers direct empirical support for
the Superstar Eﬀect.
33See for example Piketty, 2014; Piketty and Saez, 2003.
34The equivalent number for the US economy as a whole is substantially larger at about 10%.
This reflects that within a given region and industry income are less dispersed.
35The appendix confirms the results with a set of quantile regressions (see Appendix 10.2.4).
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5 Magnitudes, Monopsony and the Labor Share
Finally, I study the magnitude of top income growth and the interaction of superstar
eﬀects with imperfect competition. To quantify those eﬀects we need to express the
observed change in terms of the elasticity of top pay with respect to the market
size. This elasticity is also at the heart of previous applied work on superstar eﬀects,
Gabaix and Landier (2008), Terviö (2008) use this elasticity to calibrate the key
structural parameters of the superstar model and then simulate top income growth
among CEOs. The standard approach is to calibrate the elasticity to the correlation
of top pay and market size, proxied by ﬁrm value. An attractive feature of the
entertainment setting is that it oﬀers a direct measure of workers’ market reach, the
entertainers’ audience. Moreover, I can use plausibly exogenous variation in market
reach to identify the parameter of interest. In other words, I supplement correlational
estimates with an instrumental variables approach. These estimate use the following
regression equation:
ln(w99m,t) = α0 + α1ln(s
99
m,t) + ǫ
99
m,t (8)
where w99m,t is the 99th percentile of the entertainer wage distribution in market
m and year t, and s99m,t is the size of the market that such entertainers can reach.
Previous studies focused on variation over time or across industries to estimate α1.
The setting of this study by contrast studies variation within an industry across time
and regions and can thus control for year and labor market ﬁxed eﬀects. Moreover,
I can leverage the TV roll-out as an instrument for market reach and thus isolate
plausibly exogenous variation in market reach.
The ﬁrst stage of such an instrumental variables approach is the eﬀect of TV on
the audiences of star entertainers. This eﬀect is in-itself of interest since superstar
eﬀects have sharp predictions about the change in audience after the launch of TV.
Customers should shift from more mediocre entertainers to the stars of the profession
and in turn increase the market value of stars. To study such shifts, I ﬁrst look at
the audience of shows of local stars. The launch of a television station increased the
audience of the largest shows by about 150 log points. Converted to a growth rate
this implies a growth of over 300%, or a fourfold increase in market size (Panel A
of Table 5). It will be useful to also quantify the change in market size in dollar
terms. Such estimates quantify the change in the value of a star performer that went
hand in hand with the growth in audience size. In dollar terms market reach of stars
roughly tripled (Panel B of Table 5). This conﬁrms that the launch of TV stations
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dramatically increased the market value of top talent.
In the superstar model rising demand for stars is accompanied by declining interest
in ordinary local live entertainment. To study such eﬀects, I analyze data on county
fairs, a form of entertainment widely available throughout the US. TV leads to a
5% decline in audiences and spending at local county fairs (column 1 and 2 of Table
6). These results are however noisy and hide substantial heterogeneity across types
of entertainment. Splitting the results by types of entertainment, the data show
substantial heterogeneity in the eﬀects. Demand for entertainment that is similar to
TV, such as grandstand shows, falls signiﬁcantly, while demand for entertainment that
is diﬀerent from TV, e.g. candy sales and amusement rides, holds up (see columns 3
and 4 of Table 6 and panel B for regressions at the county level). This shows that
even within entertainment, spending on close substitutes to TV are most aﬀected
by the availability of TV signal. These result conﬁrm that TV reduced demand for
local live entertainment, increased demand for star entertainers, and shifted marginal
revenue productivity in favor of stars at the expense of ordinary entertainment.
Next, I turn to the elasticity of top pay to audience size and estimate equation 8.
A large literature has studied the relation of pay and market size, usually proxied
by ﬁrm size, and used cross-sectional regressions to estimate α1. I replicate this
approach with a cross-sectional OLS estimator in 1939 and leverage variation in the
size of local theaters across local labor markets. In line with previous results I ﬁnd
a highly signiﬁcant eﬀect of market size on top pay with a point estimate for α1 of
0.23 (see panel A. of Table 7). This means that moving from a local labor market
with a small theater to a market twice the size increases pay for a top entertainer
by 23%. The eﬀect may of course reﬂect broader diﬀerences in local labor markets,
beyond diﬀerences in market size. Indeed, after controlling for local labor market
characteristics, the eﬀect disappears almost entirely (column 2 of the same Table).36
The roll-out of TV allows me to compare such OLS estimates to an IV estimate.
The ﬁrst stage, the eﬀect of TV on audience size, is is highly signiﬁcant. The
associated ﬁrst stage F-statistic is around 20, well above conventional cutoﬀs. The IV
estimator for α1 is also highly signiﬁcant with a point estimate of 0.17. This implies
that wages at the 99th percentile grow 17% when market size doubles. While this
wage eﬀect is sizable, the eﬀect is 30% lower than the cross-sectional OLS estimate
36The panel OLS estimate would compare wages across local labor markets over time, as market
reach changes. However, in my data variation in market reach within a local labor market over time
comes exclusively from the launch of TV and hence such a panel OLS is therefore mechanically close
to the IV estimate.
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above. This suggests that the correlation of market size and top pay is bigger than
the causal eﬀect of market size. One potential driver of this upward bias is the
availability of better talent in bigger markets.
I next explore the role of monpsony power in labor markets. The benchmark
superstar model is perfectly competitive and the models’ predictions change sharply
with imperfect labor market competition, as monopsony employers will not pass-on
the surplus from greater scalability of production. This is of particular interest, since
many modern scale related technologies appear to go hand in hand with a small
number of companies that develop and control access to new scale related technologies.
In the entertainment setting we can leverage government entry restrictions to test the
role of competition for superstar eﬀects. I allow for diﬀerential eﬀects of TV in markets
with a single TV station vs. markets with multiple TV stations. The diﬀerences
between monopsonistic and competitive labor markets are striking. Markets with a
monopsony employer see almost no top income growth, while gains are large when
there are competing employers. These results are conﬁrmed when I narrow in on
the variation from the roll-out interruption (Table 8). These ﬁndings emphasize the
importance of competition for superstar eﬀects. Only when employers are competing
for talent, does growing market scale translate into rising top pay. Finally, I study
the implication for the labor share. A growing literature discusses the relation of
rising superstars and the fall in the labor share. To link my results to this literature,
I estimate how rising market value of top talent is distributed. This is implemented
by running regression 8 with data on revenues as endogenous regressor and TV as
instrument.37 TV is a strong instrument with an F-statistic between 28 and 57. The
2SLS estimate shows that one dollar growth in market value of top talent leads to 22
cents higher pay for star workers.38 A constant labor share would require that pay
grows proportionally to revenues, aka an elasticity of 1.39 These results thus strongly
conﬁrm that rising superstar eﬀects go hand in hand with a falling labor share.
37A drawback of focusing on revenues is that revenues conflate quantity and endogenous price
effects. The response of revenues thus doesn’t naturally map into map into model predictions.
38Note that this estimate is bigger than the elasticity with respect to audience size. This difference
arises because the launch of TV reduced the cost of top entertainment for consumers, which implies
that the first stage effect on revenues is relatively smaller than the one on audience size. The smaller
first-stage effect increases the IV estimate.
39Estimates of this elasticity among CEOs range between 0.1 and 1, my IV estimate thus falls
into the lower half of this range (Frydman and Saks, 2010; Gabaix and Landier, 2008).
22
6 Conclusion
Little is known about the causes of the vast changes in top incomes observed in recent
decades. Superstar Eﬀects link these changes to technical innovation, particularly in
communication technologies, where it is easier to operate over distances. This paper
provides causal evidence on the eﬀect of growing production scalability on wages and
provides an empirical test of the Superstar Eﬀect.
To test the Superstar Eﬀect, I exploit quasi-experimental variation in market
reach in the entertainment industry and show that the staggered introduction of
TV substantially changed audience sizes for entertainment shows. Star entertainers
increased their audiences fourfold through TV, and the sector experienced sharp
income concentration at the top. The increase in production scalability has profound
eﬀects on inequality at both the top and bottom of the distribution, in line with
the prediction of superstar eﬀects. The characteristic patterns of superstar eﬀects
are strongly supported in the data. Income growth escalates as we move up towards
the top of the wage distribution and the share of income going to the top 1% nearly
doubles. Moreover, the ability to reach larger markets puts many lesser stars out
of work. The number of mid-paid entertainer jobs declined signiﬁcantly and total
employment fell about 13%.
The paper also ﬁnds that competition for talent is a key driver of superstar
eﬀects, while top income growth is muted in settings with limited competition in
the labor market. This highlights that market concentration on a few stars does
not necessarily indicate malfunctioning of markets, instead the superstar eﬀects
suggests that rising market concentration is a sign of technical progress. To evaluate
ineﬃciencies associated with top income concentration, it will be important to
distinguish cases where superstar eﬀects bring better quality to a greater share of
consumers from cases where market concentration results from the break-down of
competition.
Further research is also needed to assess the magnitude of superstar eﬀects for
overall top income growth. It is important to keep in mind that superstar eﬀects arise
when production becomes scalable and talent is heterogeneous and unique. Settings
where talents are close substitutes likely exhibit smaller superstar eﬀects. As a result,
the estimates of the entertainment sector likely provide an upper bound for superstar
eﬀects in the aggregate economy, and further research is needed to measure superstar
eﬀects in additional sectors.
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7 Figures
Figure 1: Superstar Eﬀect: Employment Change at Diﬀerent Wage Levels
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[Notes] The figure shows the impact of superstar effects on employment changes across the wage distribution.
The figure is based on equation 5 for parameterization ge = 0.2x(1.3) − 1. The figure reports growth rates
across the full distribution by grouping job growth outside the range of previous support with the final bins
with positive mass and thus avoids dividing by zero.
Figure 2: TV Filming of Licensed and Blocked Stations in 1949
[Notes] Symbols show the location of TV filming and the size of a symbol indicates the number of TV
stations per local labor market. Active stations are blue circles, frozen stations red triangles. Source: FCC
reports.
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Figure 3: TV Signal of Licensed and Blocked Stations in 1949
[Note] Areas in dark blue can watch TV, while shaded areas would have had TV signal from blocked TV
stations. Signal coverage is calculated using an Irregular Terrain Model (ITM). Technical station data from
FCC files, as reported in TV Digest and Television yearbooks, are fed into the model . Signal is defined by
a signal threshold of -50 of coverage at 90% of the time at 90% of receivers at the county centroid. Source:
Fenton and Koenig (2018).
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Figure 4: Change in Entertainment 1940 – 1970
(a) Entertainer Wage Distribution
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
D
e
n
s
it
y
4 6 8 10
ln(real wage)
1940
1970
(b) Entertainer per Capita
0
200
400
600
800
E
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t 
p
e
r 
C
a
p
it
a
1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970
Census year
Performance Entertainers
Other Leisure Occupations
[Notes] Panel A shows the entertainemnet log real wage distribution in 1940 and 1970 from the lower 48
states. Dollar values are in 1950 USD. Density is estimated using the Epanechnikov smoothing kernel with
a bandwidth of 0.4 and Census sample weights. Common top code applied at $85,000. Panel B shows
employment per 100,000 inhabitants of performance entertainers (defined in text) and other leisure related
occupations (drink & dine and “other entertainment occupations”). The mean for performance entertainers
is 49 and for other leisure occupations 468. Sources: US Census 1940, 1970.
Figure 5: Position of Future TV Stars in the 1939 US Wage Distribution
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[Note] The Figure shows the CDF of wage distribution ranks of TV stars before they became TV stars. TV
stars are defined in the 1950 “Who is Who of TV”. These individuals are linked to their 1939 Census wage
records. 1939 wages are corrected for age, education and gender using a regression of log wages on a cubic
in age, 12 education dummies and a gender indicator. Source: Radio Annual, Television Yearbook 1950.
Figure 6: Number of TV Licenses Granted
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[Note] Missing issue dates of construction permits are inferred from start of operation dates. Source: TV
Digest reports.
Figure 7: Dynamic Treatment Eﬀect of TV on
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[Note] Figure plots treatment coefficients from two dynamic difference in differences regressions. Panel a)
shows the coefficient on FrozenTVm,t (comparison groups are untreated areas) and panel b) shows the
coefficient on TVm,t. Top-paid entertainers are in the top 1% of the US income distribution. Vertical lines
mark the beginning of local TV (“TV”) and the end of local TV (“Videotape”). The area shaded in light
blue marks the 95% confidence interval. Standard errors are clustered at the local labor market level.
Figure 8: Eﬀect of TV on Entertainer Employment Growth at Diﬀerent Wage Levels
-150%
-100%
-50%
0%
50%
100%
150%
200%
0-25 25-50 50-75 75-90 90-95 95-99 99-100
T
V
 E
ff
e
ct
 o
n
 E
n
te
rt
a
in
e
r 
Jo
b
s 
Bin of US Wage Distribution
[Note] Each dot is the treatment effect estimate of a separate DiD regression. It shows a TV station’s effect
on entertainer jobs at different parts of the wage distribution. Percentile bins are defined in the overall US
wage distribution. Dashes indicate 95% confidence intervals. See table 1 for details on the specification.
Sources: US Census: 1940-1970.
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Table 1: Eﬀect of TV on Entertainer Top Earners
Panel A:
99th Percentile of Entertainer Wages (log)
Local TV stations 0.138 0.126 0.100
(0.030) (0.031) (0.042)
Eﬀect/Baseline 14.8% 13.4% 10.5%
CZs (Cluster) 541 541 541
Panel B: Entertainer among Top 1% of US Earners
(% of Entertainers)
Local TV Stations 4.14 4.31 5.93
(1.26) (1.27) (2.21)
Eﬀect/Baseline 92% 96% 132%
CZs (Cluster) 722 722 722
Panel C: Entertainer among Top 1% of US Earners
(Per Capita)
Local TV Stations 0.40 0.40 0.31
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Eﬀect/Baseline 133% 133% 103%
CZs (Cluster) 722 722 722
Time & CZ FE Yes Yes Yes
Demographics – Yes –
Local labor market trends – – Yes
[Note] Outcomes: Panel A: The entertainer wage at the 99th percentile, Panel B: share top-paid entertainers, Panel
C: top-paid entertainer per capita in 10,000s. Specifications: Each cell is the result of a separate DiD regression on
the number of TV stations in the local area. All regressions control for CZ & time fixed effects and local filming cost
in years after the invention of the videotape . Demographics: median age & income, % female, % black, population
density and trends for urban areas; local labor market trends: allow for a linear trend for each local labor market.
Entertainers are actors, athletes, dancers, entertainers nec, musicians. Panel A uses the quantile DiD estimator
developed by Chetverikov, Larsen, and Palmer (2016); cells where the 99th percentile cannot be computed are
dropped. The unit of analysis is the CZ – year level in A and the the more disaggregated CZ – occupation – year
level in B and C to additionally control for year-occupation fixed effects. Panel A uses 1,435 observations and Panel
B and C 13,718 observations, demographic data is missing for one CZ in 1940. “Effect/Baseline” reports treatment
effects relative to the baseline value of the outcome variable. Observations are weighted by local labor market
population. Standard errors are reported in brackets and are clustered at the local labor market level. Sources: US
Census 1940-1970.
Table 2: Eﬀect of TV on Mobility Between Labor Markets
Panel A:
Share Entertainers who Migrated
Local TV stations -0.014 -0.017 -0.010
(0.015) (0.015) (0.020)
Panel B:
Entertainer among Top 1% of US Earners
(excl. neighbor)
Local TV stations 4.30 4.46 6.16
(1.31) (1.30) (2.27)
Time-Occupation & CZ FE Yes Yes Yes
Demographics – Yes –
Local labor market trends – – Yes
[Note] Dependent variables are, Panel A the fraction of entertainers who moved, Panel B share of Entertainers
among the top 1% of the US wage distribution, excluding labor markets that neighbor treated labor markets.
Specification details are as in Table 1, except that Panel B is run on a reduced sample of 10,792 observations.
Source: US Census 1940-1970.
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Table 3: Eﬀect of TV on Entertainer Employment
Ln(Employment in Entertainment)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: TV Signal 1930-1970
TV signalt+1 0.039
(0.033)
TV signalt -0.133 -0.127 -0.125 -0.123
(0.059) (0.059) (0.061) (0.060)
Panel B: TV Signal 1940-1970
TV signalt -0.128 -0.114 -0.134
(0.061) (0.061) (0.063)
Panel C: Placebo TV Signal
Placebo TV signalt 0.053 0.044 0.053
(0.083) (0.083) (0.084)
Clusters 722 722 722 722
Time-Occupation & CZ FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographics - Yes - -
Local Labor Market Trends - - Yes -
[Note] Dependent variable “ln(Employment in Entertainment)” is the inverse hyperbolic sine of employment
in entertainment. Control variables and specifications are as described in Table 1, except that demographic
controls exclude median income. TV signal is a dummy that takes value 1 if signal is available in a commuting
zone. Placebo TV signal is the signal of stations that were blocked. Subscript “t+1” refers to the lead of
the treatment. Standard errors, reported in brackets, are clustered at the local labor market level. Source:
TV signal from Fenton and Koenig (2018) and labor market data from US Census 1930-1970.
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Table 4: Eﬀect of TV on Top Income Shares in Entertainment
Share of Income
Top 0.1% Top 1% Top 10%
Local TV stations 2.37 3.71 6.08
(1.27) (1.69) (2.12)
Time & CZ FE Yes Yes Yes
Eﬀect/Baseline 239% 96% 33%
P-value: same growth as top 1% share 0.0043 — 0.0000
[Note] Dependent variable top p% is the share of income going to the top p percent of entertainers in a given
local labor market-year. The shares are calculated using Pareto interpolation as described in the text. The
sample includes the larger 350 labor markets and 1,069 observations. Estimates are based on a difference in
difference specification. P-values from a test of equal growth rates in top income shares are also reported.
This test is implemented in a regression with the ratio of top income shares as dependent variable. Standard
errors are clustered at the local labor market level. Sources: US Census 1940-1970.
Table 5: Eﬀect of TV on Market Reach of Local Stars
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Show Audience (log)
Local TV stations 1.499 1.526 1.146
(0.240) (0.223) (0.220)
Eﬀect/Baseline 348% 360% 215%
Panel B: Show Revenue (log)
Local TV stations 1.095 1.116 1.146
(0.207) (0.168) (0.220)
Eﬀect/Baseline 199% 205% 215%
Clusters 722 722 722
Time & CZ FE Yes Yes Yes
Demographics – Yes -
Local labor market trends – – Yes
[Note] Dependent variables are, Panel A: potential show audience of the largest show in the commuting zone,
computed from venue seating capacity and TV households in transmission area, Panel B: potential revenue
of largest show. Cells report results from separate DiD regressions across local labor markets. Control
variables are as described in Table 1. The total number of CZ - year observations are 2,656. Sources: See
text.
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Table 6: Eﬀect of TV on Spending at Local County Fairs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fair Visits (log) Ticket
Receipts
(log)
Show
Receipts (log)
Carnival
Receipts (log)
Panel A: Local Labor Market Level
TV signal -0.051 -0.047 -0.059 0.014
(0.031) (0.024) (0.022) (0.022)
Clusters 722 722 722 722
Time & Labor Market FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: County Level
TV signal -0.013 -0.014 -0.018 0.001
(0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
Clusters 3,111 3,111 3,111 3,111
Time & County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
[Note] Dependent variables are summed across county fairs in location m in year t at annual frequency
from 1946 to 1957. All variables use the the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation to approximate the
log function, while preserving 0s and monetary variables are in 1945 US Dollars. In Panel A the unit of
observation m is a local labor market and in Panel B a county. Treatment is the number of TV stations
that can be watched in the commuting zone. Data on carnival receipts (col 4) are unavailable for 1953 and
1955. Panel A uses 8,664 local labor market observations (7,220 in column 4), while Panel B uses 37,332
county observations (in col 4 31,110). Standard errors, reported in brackets, are clustered at the local labor
market level in Panel A and at the county level in Panel B. Source: Billboard Cavalcade of Fairs 1946-1957
and Fenton and Koenig (2018).
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Table 7: Elasticity of Entertainer Top Pay to Market Reach
(1) (2) (3)
99th Percentile of Entertainer Wages (log)
Panel A: OLS - Cross-section 1939
ln(Audience size) 0.234 0.023
(0.036) (0.036)
Panel B: IV
ln(Audience size) 0.166 0.149 0.149
(0.017) (0.019) (0.024)
First-stage F-statistic 33.3 25.7 20.0
Panel C: IV
ln(Value of market ($)) 0.220 0.192 0.198
(0.028) (0.022) (0.036)
First-stage F-statistic 57.10 38.1 28.7
Demographics – Yes –
Local labor market trends – – Yes
[Note] Dependent variable is the entertainer wage at the 99th percentile. Panel A reports coefficients from
a cross-sectional regression that uses variation across 573 local labor markets in 1939. Panel B and C
show results from an IV regression that uses TV stations as instrument and uses the full panel with 2,148
observations. The corresponding first stage and reduced form results are reported in table 1 and table 5.
The first-stage F-statistic is the Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic that allows for non-iid standard errors. Control
variables are described in table 1 and market reach measures in table 5. Standard errors are clustered at
the local labor market level. Sources: see table 1 and table 5.
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Table 8: Eﬀect of Competition in Labor Markets
(1) (2) (3)
Entertainer in US Top 1%
Local TV station (dummy) 5.90 0.753 -0.57
(3.06) (1.91) (0.36)
Multiple local TV station (dummy) 9.07 10.37
(4.99) (4.70)
Frozen competitor 1.43
(2.10)
Clusters 722 722 722
Time-Occupation & CZ FE Yes Yes Yes
[Note] The table shows effect heterogeneity in labor markets with a single
TV station. Sources and specification as in baseline.
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9 APPENDIX: Extensions
9.1 Equilibrium of the Superstar Model
Each stage manager maximizes proﬁts by hiring a worker with talent tp, taking its
own ﬁrm characteristic as given. It will be convenient to express the hiring decision
as choosing a percentile p from the talent distribution. Hence, in the optimization of
manager i we can write the production function Y (S, t) as Yi(p). The ﬁrm problem
is therefore given by:
maxpYi(p)− w(p)
where w(p) is the wage for a worker at percentile p of the talent distribution. Also, I
extend the model and allow for entry and exit. This gives rise to a fourth equilibrium
object, the participation threshold p¯.
Condition 1 is a consequence of the single crossing condition Yst > 0.
40 To
derive condition 2 I start from the fact that the equilibrium is incentive compatible.
Incentive compatibility guarantees that for each ﬁrm i the optimal worker p meets:
Yi(p)− w(p) ≥ Yi(p
′)− w(p′) ∀ p′ǫ[0, 1] (9)
The number of IC constraints can be reduced substantially. If the IC holds for
the adjacent p′ all the other ICs will hold as well. We can therefore focus on the
percentiles just above and below p. The IC for the adjacent p′ = p+ ǫ can be further
simpliﬁed if Y is diﬀerentiable in p. Divide equation 9 by ǫ and let ǫ→ 0.
w(p)− w(p+ ǫ)
ǫ
≤
Y (Si, p)− Y (Si, p+ ǫ)
ǫ
w′(p) = Yp(Si, p) (10)
The IC condition can thus be written as a condition on the slope of the wage schedule
and proves result 2.
Participation constraints (PC) deﬁne the participation threshold p¯. They guaran-
tee that both ﬁrms and workers are staying in the industry. Denote the reservation
wage of workers wresand the reservation proﬁts ψres and hence the PC condition is:
40For a proof see for example Sattinger, 1975.
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Yi(p)− w(p) ≥ ψ
res ∀ pǫ[p¯, 1] (11)
w(p) ≥ wres ∀ pǫ[p¯, 1] (12)
The marginal participant is indiﬀerent between participating and hence the PC binds
with equality: w(p¯) = wres and Yi(p¯)− w(p¯) = ψ
res. Individuals with lower levels of
skill will work in an outside market where pay is independent of talent and given by
wres.
Summing over all ﬁrms, we can derive the total revenue in the economy: S(π) =∫ p¯
h′(t)Y (σ(t), t)dt. In equilibrium revenues equal total expenditure, denoted by
D(π), which delivers result 3. Supply is increasing in π (since as ∂p¯∂pi < 0), hence
there is a unique market clearing price πˆ as long as demand is downward sloping
D′(π) < 0.
9.2 Skill Biased Technical Change and Pay Dispersion
The skill biased technical change model features two groups of workers, high (H) and
low (L) skilled workers. To give the model the best possible shot at ﬁtting the data
assume that workers can have diﬀerent amounts of H and L, call the quantity of skill
t. Assume that t is distributed with an inverse CDF hH(t) and hL(t) respectively.
Within a skill group workers are perfect substitutes and the ﬁrm therefore cares only
about the total units of H and L employed. Production is given by a CES function
with Ai the productivity of skill group i:
Y (H,L) =
[
AH(
∑
tH)θ +AL(
∑
tL)θ
]1/θ
Because workers are perfect substitutes the law of one price applies. There is a
single market clearing price for a unit of low and high talent, call them πH and πL.
The price of high talent is given by:
πH = AH
[∑
tH
Y
]θ−1
And the wage of a high skilled individual with quantity of skill tH is given by:
wtH = πH · t
H
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Call the inverse CDF of wages pwSBTC and the probability that a wage is above wp is:
pwSBTC = Pr(wtH > wp) = Pr(t
H >
wp
πH
) = hH(
wp
πH
)
The top tail of the wage distribution follows the same distribution as tH .41 With
Pareto shape parameter α˜ the talent distribution is hH(t) = t
−1/α˜ and substituting
this into the wage distribution yields a wage equation equivalent to the superstar
distribution in 4 for the right value of α˜.
9.3 Technical Change and Superstar Effects
This section derives proposition 2.1.
Part a) to see how growth varies across the distribution, diﬀerentiate equation 5
wrt to the percentile of the distribution
∂ge
∂p
=
λ˜ξ˜
λξ
(κ− 1)
κ
ξ
α
w
(κ−1)
κ
ξ
α
−1∂w
∂p
> 0
Since wages are increasing along the wage distribution, the expression on the RHS
is positive. Hence, the growth rate increase as we move up the distribution, which
proves part a). Note that an equivalent result holds for wage growth at the top.
Part b)The top income share is deﬁned as the sum of incomes of individuals above
percentile p divided by total income (G):
sp =
∫ 1
p
wjdj/G
We showed above that wages follow a Pareto distribution with shape parameter λ = αξ .
Note that for a Pareto distributions the top income share is given by sp = (1− p)
1−λ,
with λ−1 the shape parameter of the distribution.42 The growth in the top income
share from superstar eﬀects is therefore given by:
gsp =
st+1p
stp
≈
(1− p)1−
ξ
κα
(1− p)1−
ξ
α
= (1− p)−(κ−1)
ξ
κα
41Here we assume that low skill workers do not features in the top tail of the wage distribution.
42Even for variables that do not follow a Pareto distribution, there is still a lambda now varying
with p. Many income variables are approximately Pareto and lambda is only slowly varying and
the result holds approximately. This result has been used extensively to calculate top income and
wealth shares.
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The second step uses the property of a Pareto variable, the approximate result indi-
cates that this results can works approximately for a much wider set of distributions.
The ﬁnal equality cancels terms. Top incomes shares are growing and we can see
that the growth rate is increasing in p. This implies that the income share of the top
0.1% growths faster than the share that goes to the top 1%, which in turn growths
faster than the share of the top 10%. The top 1% takes home a growing fraction of
the income among the top 10%.
The core result, that a unit of talent becomes more valuable, holds independent
of the distributional assumptions. As it becomes feasible to serve bigger markets, the
wage-talent proﬁle pivots and becomes steeper. For the general case we can show
this by diﬀerentiating condition 2 with respect to s:
wps(t
∗) = Yps(t
∗) + Ypp(t
∗)
∂t
∂s
=
w′′(t∗)
θ′(t∗)
> 0 (13)
The second equality uses positive assortative matching to invert the assignment
function t∗ = σ−1(s) and diﬀerentiates to yield ∂t∂s =
1
σ′(t) . The eﬀect of market size
on the wage slope is positive. This follows from the convex wage schedule discussed
above and the positive assortative matching of talent and market size. We don’t
need to appeal to the envelope theorem here. The envelope theorem doesn’t apply
in an assignment model. An employer who increases the market size is able to
poach a better worker from a competitor and thus has ﬁrst order eﬀects on other
market participants. Even without appealing to the envelope theorem we can sign
the equation as long as the assignment function is invertible.
Part c) The falling wage is a result of the growing supply of talent, which reduces
π. As a result the Pareto scale parameter in equation 4 falls (λ′ < λ) and the wage
distribution shifts inward.43 This level shift occurs across the distribution, among
stars the growth in returns from scalability over-compensates for the fall in π, but for
non-stars the decline in π dominates. This eﬀect is also reﬂected in the share of jobs
with mid pay. Given the assumption on the demand elasticity (1− ε < (γφπ)κ−1),
the ﬁrst term of equation 5 is smaller than 1 (ie λ˜ξ˜λξ < 1). As w → 1, the growth rate
ge =
λ˜ξ˜
λξ − 1 < 0 and hence the share of jobs at such pay levels is declining.
Part d) In the model with entry and exit the participation constraint (PC)
43If we maintain that the outside option is fixed at a level b, the lowest wages are fixed at b and
adjustment occurs through exit rather than falling wages. Wages at the bottom could decline if
there is a cost to exiting, for example search costs, or if payoffs from the outside option also fall.
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ensures that the marginal participant is indiﬀerent between working and the outside
option: w(p¯) = wres. Deriving the equilibrium wage from integrating 2, we get
w(p) =
∫ p
p¯ Yt(σ(t), t)dh(t). And hence: w(p¯) = Yt(σ(p¯), p¯) = w
res. When Yt
ﬂuctuates changes in p¯ ensure that the PC holds. Raising p¯ implies that the returns
for the marginal worker Yt(σ(p¯), p¯) increase, since Ytt + Yts > 0. Hence when
falling talent prices (π˜ < π) lead to a decrease in Yt, equilibrium requires that the
participation threshold increases. Periods of technical change therefore lead to higher
p¯, which conﬁrms statement d).
9.4 Technical Change and SBTC Models
9.4.1 Proportional Top Income Growth
Skill biased technical progress makes high skilled workers more productive (A˜H > AH).
The wage per talent unit therefore becomes:
π˜H = A˜H
[∑
t˜H
Y˜
]θ−1
> πH
Next consider wages. The baseline case assumes that labor supply is inelastic,
hence the talent distribution (hH(t)) is unchanged. Allowing for a labor supply
response complicates notation and generates little additional insight.44 The wages at
p are given by:
pwSBTC = (w˜p/π
′)−
1
α˜ (14)
We now can show that technical change leads to very limited change in the distribution
of wages. The growth of wages is given by:
gwp =
w˜p
wp
=
π˜H
πH
= gw
Wage growth is the same across all percentiles in the top tail. At the top of the
distribution technical change leads to a level shift in the wage schedule.
44The higher wage induces entry of workers where w˜t growths above the outside option b. These
are workers with low levels of t and as a result the distribution of talent changes at the bottom end.
For ordinary talent distributions this has little effect on the top tail of G−1H (p). The result that
follow therefore carry through approximately at the the top of the distribution.
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9.4.2 No Fractile Inequality
With a skill biased demand shock the growth in the top income share is given by:
gsp =
st+1p
stp
=
Gt
Gt+1
πt+1
∫ 1
p p
−αdp
πt
∫ 1
p p
−αdp
=
gpi
gG
The second step uses the deﬁnition of top income shares and equation 14. The ﬁnal
step collects terms and cancels. Top income shares grow as long as the price for
talent growths faster than GDP. Strikingly, the growth rate of the top income share
at p is independent of p. All top income shares are growing at the same rate. The
ratio of the income share that goes to the top 1% and 10% is therefore unaﬀected by
SBD shocks.
9.4.3 No Cannibalisation in SBTC Models
This section proofs that technical progress rules out falling wages in the SBTC
model. I study a ﬂexible SBTC model with arbitrary many skill groups 1 ... n. The
production function is given by:
F (α1(θ)L1, α2(θ)L2, ..., αn(θ)Ln)
Where Li is type of labor i and αi the associated productivity and θ is the driver
of technical change. We allow for exit and therefore impose that no worker type is
indispensable in production:
∂F
∂Li
<∞ ∀Li
Technical change may aﬀect diﬀerent parts of the distribution diﬀerently, in particular
we allow for extreme bias technical change that predominantly helps star workers.
We do not ex-ante rule out that changes in technology reduces productivity for some
types of workers. However, we impose that the overall eﬀect of technology is positive,
hence we assume there is no technical regress in production:
∂F
∂θ
=
∑
Li
∂αi
∂θ
∂F
∂Li
> 0 (15)
We want to show that this implies that:
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∂αi
∂θ
≥ 0 ∀i
We proceed by contradiction and assume this was not the case, hence ∂αi∂θ < 0 for
some i. To see that this violates restriction 15, assume that all Lj = 0 for all j 6= i
and Li > 0 for i. This implies
∂F
∂θ < 0, violating the assumption that technical
progress cannot lead to falling productivity.
9.4.4 Extending SBTC to match Superstar Effects
It is useful to think abour changes to the SBTC model that are needed to replicate
properties of superstar eﬀects. The relation between the the two models is particularly
apparent if we take the Rosen, 1981 superstar model where f(s, t) = s· q(s, t), hence
output of an actor with quality t and audience s depends on the audience size s
and the quality of the output produced q. Market clearing ensures that demand
equals supply at price π and if spending is inelastic at K, market clearing becomes∫
π· f(s, t)h′(t)g′(s)dsdt = K. To deﬁne production function properties I use the
following notation q˙ = log(q) and derivatives are indicated by subscriptes. Assume
q˙s < 0, q˙t > 0 and q˙sq > 0. Take a production function that meets this requirement,
for instance:
qi = tie
1−δtsi
the quality of output q is a product of talent (ti) of individual i and crowdedness of
the show s; the more exclusive the show, the higher is the utility from it. Having
Madonna play at a private dinner party brings greater utility, compared to listening
to the same song on a recording. Comparative advantage (q˙sq > 0) implies that a
world class performer is better able to deal with bigger audiences and thus quality
suﬀers less from crowding ∂δt/∂t < 0. Take the simple case where δt = t
−φ, and φ
is the technology that determines how easy it is to deliver a performance to a large
audience. An increase in φ, as before, implies it gets easier to scale productions.
Wages are given by w(s, t) = P (q(s, t))s, with P the price charged for a show of
quality q. Proﬁt maximizing implies equilibrium wages are given by:45
45with equilibrium s = −q/qs. Notice that wages feature the “talent amplification effect,” where
wages are more dispersed than talent, as long as φ > 1. The intercept term captures the market
value of a talent unit and does not vary by talent, it therefore is a level shifter in wages.
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w˙i = π˙ + t˙iφ
Superstar eﬀects arise when φ increases, hence when it gets easier to reach big
audiences. Wages are aﬀected by this in two ways:
∂w˙
∂φ
= π˙φ + t˙i
the ﬁrst term (πφ) is identical for all types of workers, while the later term (ti) is bigger
for more talented actors. The ﬁrst term captures the cannibalisation eﬀect that hurts
all workers as πφ < 0, but this particularly aﬀects the less talented actors who don’t
simultaneously beneﬁt from the oﬀsetting scale eﬀects. As a result of the technical
shift wage dispersion goes up, notice that this result relates to the dispersion in log
wages. This log wage dispersion is an important diﬀerence to standard models of skill
biased demand, where workers are paid in line with their productivity: wi = ati. A
skill biased demand shock, which increase the skill premium (a ↑), changes the wage
distribution, but has only a level eﬀect on the dispersion in log wages. SBTC therefore
do not generate dispersion in log wages. The SBTC model can replicate superstar
eﬀects if we make each skill type unique. Hence, rather than assuming that people
have diﬀerent levels of skill, we assume that each worker is a speciﬁc skill group. The
crucial diﬀerence is that it makes all workers imperfect substitutes and thus allows
wages across individuals to diﬀer by more than there skill units. Simultaneously, this
makes it feasible for wage gaps to grow diﬀerentially for workers with the same skill
discrepancy and thus we can make a marginal talent unit more valuable at the top
and generate superstar eﬀects. The clue is that imperfect substitutability breaks the
law of one price which forced wage diﬀerences to be proportional to skill diﬀerences.
Each individual has it’s own productivity term and the wage of i is given by:
wi = Ai
[
1
Y
]θ−1
we can thus replicate superstar eﬀects if a technical change generates ∂A˙∂φ = π˙φ+ t˙i. A
model with a continuous distribution of unique talent types replicates, but does not
coincide with the superstar model. A key diﬀerence is the process that generates wage
dispersion. In the SBTC model wage inequality changes from biased productivity
shifts, while the superstar model is more parsimonious and rising inquality is the
result of the more speciﬁc SRTC.
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There are two unappealing feature of extending the SBTC model in the way
described above. First, the model becomes overly general – we have as many
productivity terms as workers and thus can explain any kind of wage change, making
it a somewhat uninteresting model. Second, to explain falling wages we require
technical regress. This requires a counterintuitive scenario where lower skilled workers
lose access to the previous, more productive technology. In other words innovation
makes them “forget” how to be productive.
10 APPENDIX: Empirics
10.1 Summary Statistics
Table 9 reports summary statistics for the baseline local labor market sample. This
covers the 722 local labor markets for 4 Census years and thus 2,888 observations.
The ﬁrst set of results report statistics on the availability of television. Television
was unavailable in the ﬁrst decade and becomes available in later decades. For
ﬁlming however, the advent of national ﬁlming leads to a decline. Averaging over the
full sample period there is only 0.02 TV stations ﬁlming in an average local labor
market. This of course hides large variation across time and space capturing regional
heterogeneity and the rise and disappearance of local TV ﬁlming discussed in the
text. Data for show audience and revenues is only available for a subset of local labor
markets due to missing data. The next set of statistics cover local entertainer labor
markets. The average local labor market employs 177 performance entertainers. But
there is considerable heterogeneity across local labor markets, stemming from the
diﬀerence in the population of local labor markets (see demographics). Employment
in all other leisure related activities – include drink & dine professions, as well as
interactive leisure activities – is about 2,500 individuals in an average local labor
market. The 99th percentile of the entertainer wage distribution average close to
$5,700. As described in the text, this value is only computed for the larger local labor
markets. Data on county fairs reports average attendance and spending in three
categories: tickets, shows, rides & carnival. These data show that county fairs are a
popular event, the average fair attracts about 25,000 visitors. This data is available at
higher frequency and spans over 8,000 local labor market-year observations. Finally,
the table reports demographic information on the population in the local labor
markets. The average local labor market has 229,000 inhabitants and 86,000 workers,
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earning on average $1,698. Median income is missing for one observation.
10.2 Robustness checks
10.2.1 Top Income Metrics
The baseline outcome variable normalizes the number of top earners by aggregate
employment in entertainment. This has the convenient eﬀect that the result is a
percentage change. The numerator doesn’t vary at the local labor market level,
changes in this variable should therefore be captured by the year ﬁxed eﬀect. We may
however worry that since the variable enters multiplicatively, the additive year ﬁxed
eﬀect doesn’t completely control for changes in the denominator. In column 2 Table
12 I therefore re-run the baseline regression using the count of top earners as outcome.
In an average labor market 18 individuals are in the top percentile. TV more than
doubles the number of top earners. Column 1 repeats the baseline regression. The
normalization changes the units of the results, but the basic conclusion remains
unchanged. This conﬁrms that the normalization has no substantive eﬀect on the
result.
Figure 14 illustrated the evolution of various alternative top income measures.
The ﬁgure shows the the 99th percentile of the Census wage distribution over time.
This is the threshold that deﬁnes top earners in the baseline estimates. The ﬁgure
contrasts this threshold with alternative top income thresholds. These include the
thresholds calculated by (Piketty & Saez, 2003) and the 95th percentile of the wage
distribution and the 95th percentile of the entertainer wage distribution. All of these
are below the wage top-code applied in the data. The series move similarly. In
practice it will therefore matter little how a top earner is deﬁned. Table 12 conﬁrms
this formally. It repeats the previous analysis using other top income measures.
Column 1 repeats the baseline estimate. Column 3 uses the top income percentile as
deﬁned by (Piketty & Saez, 2003). With this deﬁnition of top earners slightly more
entertainers are top earners. The eﬀect of TV remains however unchanged. The the
number of people in the top percentile about doubles.
Column 4 and 5 look at the wage distribution among entertainers. By deﬁnition
1% of entertainers will earn wages above the 99th percentile of the entertainer wage
distribution. Mechanically the share of top earners thus can’t change. Instead
the analyses looks at where these individuals live. If TV had a positive eﬀect on
top incomes, the number of top earning entertainers increases in areas where TV
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productions are ﬁlmed and declines elsewhere. With the Census data it is not possible
to analyze the 99th percentile of the entertainer wage distribution This value is above
the top code in some years. While we saw that the 99th percentile of the overall wage
distribution stays below the top code, the same doesn’t hold true in entertainment
wage distribution because entertainer wages are more skewed than overall wages. The
analysis therefore looks at entertainers above the 95th percentile of the entertainer
wage distribution. Analyzing within entertainer wage dispersion has the appealing
advantage that it is a measure of inequality in the aﬀected sector. This measure
is however problematic if TV induces substantial exit in the entertainment sector.
Exits would shift the 95th percentile even in the absence of any eﬀect of television
on top earners. If television results in an exit of the bottom 10% of entertainers, the
95th wage percentile would rise. If there was no further eﬀect on top earners, we
would ﬁnd that fewer entertainers are top earners after the introduction of television.
Hence, this measure will lead to a downward biased in the estimate of TV. Indeed in
column 3 the number of top earners increases by less. The increase here is 20% over
the baseline. To address the endogeneity issue column 4 keeps the 95th percentile
ﬁxed at the 1940 level. This measure is thus unaﬀected by exit of entertainers. This
estimate is indeed substantially bigger than column 3. These results conﬁrm that
television led to a substantial increase in top earnings in entertainment.
10.2.2 Pre-Trend
A challenge for estimating pre-trends with this sample is that wage data in the Census
is ﬁrst collected in 1939. Since the Census is decennial this only allows for a single
pre-treatment period. To estimate pre-trends I therefore combine the Census data
with data from Internal Revenue Services (IRS) tax return data. In 1916 the IRS
published aggregate information on top earners by occupation-state bins. Data for
actors and athletes are reported. I link the Census data with the tax data and run
the regressions at the state level. Table 14 reports the results. Column 1 repeats the
baseline estimate with data aggregated at the state level. Despite the aggregation at
the state level the eﬀect remains highly signiﬁcant. Column 2 adds the additional
1916 data from the IRS. The results stay unchanged. Column 3 shows the diﬀerences
in top earners in treatment and control group for the various years. It shows a marked
jump up in top earners in the treated group in the year of local TV production. The
coeﬃcient on the pre-trend is not signiﬁcant because the standard errors are large.
If anything the pre-period saw to a decrease relative decrease in top earners in the
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treatment areas. Even if taken at face value the pre-trends thus can’t explain the
identiﬁed positive eﬀect of TV.
10.2.3 Placebo Occupations
Television only changed the production function of a handful of occupations, we can
therefore use alternative occupations as placebo group. The ideal placebo group will
pick up changes in top income in the local economy. The main high pay occupations
are therefore used as placebo group, these professions are medics, engineers, managers
and service professionals. If TV assignment is indeed orthogonal to local labor
market conditions, we would expect that such placebo occupations are unaﬀected.
Results for the placebo group are reported in 15. TV does not show up in top pay
of the placebo occupations. The only occupation group with a signiﬁcant positive
eﬀect are performance entertainers. Column 1 shows that the placebo group doesn’t
experience any growth in top incomes. Moreover, the estimated eﬀect on performance
entertainers remains similar to the baseline in Table 15. Column 2 allows for separate
impact of television across the diﬀerent placebo occupations. Only performance
entertainers experience the signiﬁcant and large top earner rise.
With the inclusion of the placebo occupations, I can run a full triple diﬀerence
regression. In this speciﬁcation there are treated and untreated workers within
each labor market. We already controlled for location speciﬁc trends before, this
speciﬁcation will go further and allow for a non-parametric location speciﬁc time
ﬁxed eﬀect. An example where this might be necessary is if improved local credit
conditions result in greater demand for premium entertainment and simultaneously
lead to the launch of a new TV channel. This may lead to an upward bias in the
estimates. My treatment now varies at the time, labor market and occupation level.
This allows me to control for pairwise interactions of time, market and occupation
ﬁxed eﬀects. These will address the outlined credit access problem as the ﬁxed eﬀects
will now absorb location speciﬁc time eﬀects.
Column 3 shows the results. The eﬀect on performance entertainers remains close
to the baseline estimate. The additional location speciﬁc time and occupation ﬁxed
eﬀects therefore don’t seem to change the ﬁndings. This rules out a large number of
potential confounder. The introduction of a "superstar technology" thus has a large
causal eﬀect on top incomes and this eﬀect is unique to the treated group.
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10.2.4 Quantile Regressions
A further method of testing the eﬀect of TV across the distribution is through quantile
regressions. A number of recent papers have extended the use of conditional quantile
regressions to panel settings. In the linear regression framework additive ﬁxed eﬀects
lead to a "within" transformation of the data. In the non-linear quantile framework
additive linear ﬁxed eﬀects will not result in the standard "within" interpretation of
the estimates. Adding ﬁxed eﬀects may therefore not be suﬃcient for identiﬁcation.
Chetverikov, Larsen, and Palmer (2016) develop an quantile estimator that handles
group level unobserved eﬀects if treatment varies at the group level. Similarly, Powell,
2016 develops a panel quantile estimator that mimics the "within" transformation of
ﬁxed eﬀects for the quantile regression.
A shortcoming of the quantile regression is that the estimates are sensitive to
entry and exit. The magnitude of the quantile eﬀect is therefore hard to interpret.
However, the relative magnitude across percentiles is still informative and the test
relies exclusively on such relative patterns. Recall that SBD predicts a homogeneous
growth rate, while the superstar model predicts larger wage growth rates at the top.
To test whether either model matches the data, I run quantile regressions at various
percentiles. I restrict myself to quantiles for the median and above since the results
were derived by using an approximation for the top of the distribution. I follow the
procedure in Chetverikov et al. (2016) to implement the diﬀerence in diﬀerence for
quantile regressions. The estimated coeﬃcients are plotted in ﬁgure 16, alongside the
prediction of the SBD model. The eﬀect is biggest at the top of the distribution and
eﬀects are notably smaller at the lower percentiles. This result is in line with the
superstar model but contradicts a model of SBD. Table 16 reports the panel quantile
estimates using the Powell, 2016 approach.
10.3 Data construction
10.3.1 Local labor markets
The analysis deﬁnes local labor markets as commuting zones (CZ). A labor market
is an urban center and the surrounding commuters belt. The CZs fully cover the
mainland US. The regions are delineated by minimizing ﬂows across boundaries and
maximizing ﬂows within labor markets, they are therefore constructed to yield strong
within-labor-market commuting and weak across-labor-market commuting. David
Dorn provides crosswalks of Census geographic identiﬁers to commuting zones (Autor
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& Dorn, 2013). I use these crosswalks for the 1950 and 1970 data
I build additional crosswalks for the remaining years. For each Census I use
historic maps for the smallest available location breakdown. I map the publicly
available Census location identiﬁers into a commuting zone. No crosswalk is available
for the 1960 geographic Census identiﬁer in the 5% sample and the 1940 Census
data. Recent data restoration allows for more detailed location identiﬁcation than
was previously possible (mini-PUMAs). To crosswalk the 1940 data, I use maps that
deﬁne boundaries of the identiﬁed areas. In GIS software I compute the overlap of
1940 counties and 1990 CZ. In most cases counties fall into a single CZ. A handful of
counties are split between CZ. For cases where more than 3 percent of the area falls
into another CZ, I construct a weight that assigns an observation to both commuting
zones. The two observations are given weights so that they together count as a
single observation. The weight is the share of the county’s area falling into the CZ.
The same procedure is followed for 1960 mini PUMAs. Carson city county (ICSPR
650510) poses a problem. This county only emerges as a merger of Ormsby and
Carson City in 1969, but observations in IPUMS are already assigned to this county
in 1940. I assign them to Ormsby county (650250). CZ 28602 has no employed
individual in the complete count data in 1940.
10.3.2 Worker data
Data is provided by the Integrated Public Use Microdata Files (IPUMS, Ruggles,
Genadek, Goeken, Grover, and Sobek, 2017) of the US decennial census from 1930-
1970 (excluding Hawaii and Alaska). I use the largest publicly available sample for
each Census, for 1970 I combine form 1 and form 2 metro samples to obtain the most
granular spatial data. Extending the time period in either direction is precluded
by changes in variable deﬁnitions. Prior to 1930, the Census used a signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent deﬁnition of employed workers than in my period of interest, and from
1980 onwards, the Census uses diﬀerent occupation groups. Most variables remain
unchanged throughout the sample period. IPUMS has taken great care to provide
consistent measures of variables that did change.
• there are 722 commuting zones (CZ) covering the mainland USA. These regions
are consistently deﬁned over time.
• there are 28 relevant occupations. 1950 occupation codes are
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– Treatment group: 1, 5, 31, 51, 57
– Placebo group: 0, 32, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 55, 73, 75, 82, 200,
201, 204, 205, 230, 280, 290, 480
• Aggregates are calculated using the provided sample weights
• variables used incwage, occ1950 (in combination with empstat), wkswork2,
hrswork2
• To match TV signal exposure to the Census I map county level TV signal
information onto geographic units available in the Census. The geographic
match uses the boundary shapeﬁles provided by NHGIS (Manson, Schroeder,
Riper, and Ruggles, 2017). I then identify how many TV-owning households
are in each TV station’s catchment area. This allows me to construct a measure
of potential audience size.
10.3.3 Employment
Number of workers are based on labforce and empstat. Both variables are consistently
available for 16+ year olds. Hence the sample is restricted to that age group.
Occupation is recorded for age>14. I use this information for all employed. This is
available consistently with the exception of institutional inmates who are excluded
until 1960. The magnitude of this change is small and the time ﬁxed eﬀect will
absorb the eﬀect on the overall level of employment. The deﬁnition of employment
changes after the 1930 Census. Before the change, the data doesn’t distinguish
between employment and unemployment. In the baseline analysis I therefore focus
on the period from 1940 onwards. For this period the change doesn’t pose a problem.
An alternative approach is to build a harmonized variable for a longer period, this
includes the unemployed in the employment count for all years. I build this alternative
variable and perform robustness checks with it. The results remain similar. For
two reasons the impact of this change on the results is smaller than one might ﬁrst
think. First, most unemployed don’t report an occupation and thus don’t fall into
the sample of interest.46 Second, the rate of unemployed is modest compared to
46There are a number of cases were the unemployed report an occupation. This occurs if they
have previously worked. I construct an employment series that includes such workers for the entire
sample period. This measure is a noisy version of employment as some job losers continue to count
as employed. Since the share of these workers is small, the correction has only small effects on the
results.
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employment and thus including them doesn’t dramatically change the numbers.
I use the IPUMS 1950 occuption calssiﬁcation (Occ1950). This data is available for
years 1940-1970. For previous years the data is constructed using IPUMS methodology
from the original occupation classiﬁcation. Occupational deﬁnitions change over time.
IPUMS provides a detailed methodology to achieve close matches across various
vintages of the US census. Luckily the occupations used in this analysis are little
aﬀected by changes over time. More details on the changes and how they have been
dealt with are: The pre 1950 samples use an occupation system that IPUMS judges
to be almost equivalent. For those samples IPUMS states: "the 1940 was very similar
to 1950, incorporating these two years into OCC1950 required very little judgment on
our part. With the exception of a small number of cases in the 1910 data, the pre1940
samples already contained OCC1950, as described above." For the majority of years
no adjustment all is therefore necessary. Changes for the 1950-1960 period - Actors
(1950 employment count in terms of 1950 code: 14,921 and in terms of 1960 code:
14,721), other entertainment professions are unaﬀected. Changes from 1960-1970:
Pre 1970 teachers in music and dancing were paired with musicians and dancers. In
1970 teachers become a separate category. My analysis excludes teachers and thus is
unaﬀected by this change. Athletes disappear in 1970 coding. The analysis therefore
only uses the athlete occupation until 1960. The only change that has a major eﬀect
on worker counts is for "Entertainers nec". In 1970 ca. 9,000 workers that were
previously categorized as "professional technical and kindred workers" are added and
a few workers from other categories. The added workers account for ca. 40 percent of
the new occupation group. The occupation speciﬁc year eﬀect ought to absorb this
change. I have also performed the analysis excluding 1970 and ﬁnd similar results.
Moreover I ﬁnd the TV eﬀects for each occupation individually. The classiﬁcation
changes therefore seem to have little eﬀect on the results.
The industry classiﬁcation also changes over time. I use the industry variable to
eliminate teachers from the occupations "Musicians and music teacher" and "Dancers
and dance teachers." The census documentation does not note any change to the
deﬁnition of education services over the sample period, however the scope of the
variable ﬂuctuates substantially over time. From 1930 to 1940 the employment falls
from around 70,000 to 20,000, from 1950 to 1960 it increases to around 200,000 and
falls back to around 90,000 from 1960 to 1970.
The control group are workers in top earning professions outside entertainment
(lawyer, medics, engineers, managers, ﬁnancial service). The relevant occupations
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are available across most years. Exceptions are 1940 where a few occupations
in engineering, medicine and interactive leisure are grouped together and in 1970
where the ﬂoor men category is discontinued. I control for those changes with year-
occupation ﬁxed eﬀects in the regressions. The eﬀects occur within occupations
rather than between them, results for all occupations separately are available upon
request.
10.3.4 Wage data
Labor earnings are used to be consistent with the model (wages, salaries, commissions,
cash bonuses, tips, and other money income received from an employer). This diﬀers
from Piketty et al who use earnings data of tax units. As described above, I use
wage data and focus on individual data rather than earnings of a tax unit. This
choice makes economically sense for this setting. The superstar theory is concerned
with individual labor earnings and abstracts from household composition and capital
income.
The data is from the US Census with the following sample features. Census data
on wages refer to the previous calendar year. In 1940 and 1960+ every individual
replies to this question - in 1950 only sample line individuals do (sub-sample). The
1940 100% sample is not top coded, other years are. The 99th percentile threshold
is always below the top code, hence the top code doesn’t pose a problem here. I
calculate measures for top income dispersion in entertainment for each market by year.
Some measures, for instance income dispersion, are not additive across occupations
and I therefore calculate a single dispersion coeﬃcient per year-local entertainer labor
market, which pools the micro data for the ﬁve occupations aﬀected by TV. Wage
data is in real 1950 terms
10.3.5 Pareto Interpolation
Top income shares can be computed straight from the data if the full population is
covered. Without information on the full population the standard approach in the
literature is to use Pareto approximations (e.g. Atkinson and Piketty, 2010; Atkinson,
Piketty, and Saez, 2011; Blanchet, Fournier, and Piketty, 2017; Feenberg and Poterba,
1993; Kuznets and Jenks, 1953; Piketty and Saez, 2003). This assumes that the
income distribution is locally Pareto and interpolates incomes between two observed
individuals, moreover it allows to extrapolate the top tail of the distribution. In a
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Pareto distribution two parameters, pin down the wage distribution. In practice there
are a number of challenges. Key to the dispersion is the “Pareto coeﬃcient.” There
are at least four challenges in estimating the parameter. The ﬁrst is misspeciﬁcation,
we do not belief that wages exactly follow a Pareto distribution. Second, outcomes
are an order statistic which violates the iid assumption. Third measurement error in
wages aﬀects the regressor. Fourth in samples the population rank of an observation
is not observed. I address these issues by analyzing the performance of popular
methods in years where the full population data allows for validation.
The beauty of the Pareto distribution is that a it is a straight line in the log
space. This holds because the CDF of a Pareto distribution is linear in logs:
1 − F (w) = (w/ω)−1/α. Once we know two points on the line we can recon-
struct the slope and intercept of the line and have fully characterized the dis-
tribution. The slope captures the “Pareto coeﬃcient”. The slope is given by:
αi,j = [ln(incomei)− ln(incomej)] / [ln(ranki)− ln(rankj)]. Since we usually ob-
serve many points we could calculate many Pareto coeﬃcients and combine them in
an optimal way. Fortunately economist have thought about the best way of ﬁtting a
line through a cloud of points. We can ﬁt a line to estimate the Pareto coeﬃcient by
running a regression of the form47:
ln(incomei) = β − α · ln(ranki) + ǫi
It turns out that OLS is a poor approach here. The Gauß Markov assumptions are
violated making OLS ineﬃcient and bias. The outcome variables are order statistics,
resulting in heteroskedacticity and correlation of errors across observations. Moreover,
the log transformation implies that E(ǫi) = E(logεi) 6= 0, making OLS biased. The
latter problem can be addressed by replacing the regressor with the Harmonic index
( Blanchet, 2016). And eﬃciency can be achieved with MLE.48 Polivka, 2001 and
Armour, Burkhauser, and Larrimore, 2015 give an overview how MLE can be applied
to this problem. A further challenge is misspeciﬁcation. The Pareto distribution
is used as an approximation and may not ﬁt the data perfectly. In particular the
distribution may ﬁt better at the top than the bottom of the distribution. Even
at the top of the distribution changing Pareto coeﬃcients may be required to ﬁt
the data (Blanchet et al., 2017). Misspeciﬁcation is particularly problematic for the
47Here β = ln(income) − ln(rank) where lower bars represent the lower bound of the interval
considered
48Since the covariance structure of order statistics is known, GLS yields the same result
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more eﬃcient estimators (Finkelstein, Tucker, and Alan Veeh, 2006). I will test the
performance of three estimators using real-world data by drawing samples from the
full-count Census. This allows us to assess how estimators cope in data with i) small
samples, ii) top coding and iii) bunching at tax thresholds and round numbers. I test
the following estimators:
• Estimator with n total observations, T top coded observations, rankj the rank
in the wage distribution (1 being the top), wj wage at rank j and ω the smallest
wage in the sample:
• MLE: βˆMLE = 1n
∑n
j=1 log(wj/ω)
• MLE (top code adjusted): βˆMLETC = Tn
∑n
j=T log(wj/ω) + T ∗ log(w
TC/ω)
• OLS: log(wj) = δ − β
OLS ∗ ln(
rankj
n+1 ) + ǫj
• Close to cut-oﬀ: βˆA = (
∑3
j=1
ln(wj/wj−1)
ln(rankj/rankj−1)
)−1
• Extrapolation: The standard method of calculating top income shares ﬁts a
Pareto curve through the observed data and computes income shares as area
under the curve. For the Pareto distribution the fraction that falls in the tail is
captured by a single Parameter. We can thus compute any top income share
once we know the tail index of the Pareto distribution. For other distributions
the tail index varies for diﬀerent percentiles, in that case we have one shape
parameter that allows to compute the top 1% income share and a diﬀerent one
to compute the top 0.1% share. A well known feature of extreme value theory
is that in the the tail many regular distribution only diﬀer by a slow moving
function from the Pareto. Using the Pareto parameter estimate just below the
cut-oﬀ may thus yield a reasonable approximation even if the data generating
process is not Pareto.
Table 17 shows the results. They suggest that OLS and MLE perform relatively
poorly in small samples of the data of interest. I ﬁnd that the best performing
estimator is the average of the alpha values just below the top code. The diﬀerence
to OLS and MLE estimates is the weight attached to values far from the top-code.
OLS and MLE give a non zero weight to observations further away from the top-code.
This approach will yield greater bias if the Pareto distribution is not a perfect ﬁt
and observations far from the top-code are poor proxies for the distribution beyond
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the top-code. Consistent with this, I ﬁnd that the OLS and MLE perform worse in
smaller samples. For the application here I therefore focus on Pareto interpolation
based on observations closest to the top-code. It should be stressed that this result is
speciﬁc to the data in this context. More general results for Pareto inference with
real-world data should be conducted to establish the wider relevance.
For each local labor market and year I derive the Pareto coeﬃcient. At the bottom
of the income distribution the Pareto distribution has been found be a poor ﬁt, I
therefore discard Pareto parameters based on observations at the bottom quarter
of the distribution. The results are however robust to including those observations.
Next, I use the local labor market- year speciﬁc Pareto coeﬃcient to estimate top
income shares. Here I make use of the fact that for a Pareto distribution top income
shares are given by: Sp% = (1− p)
α−1
α .
10.3.6 Data on Market Reach of Entertainment Shows
Data on potential show audiences is collected from the “Julius Cahn-Gus Hill theatrical
guide.” For each local labor market I compute the potential maximum audience. For
physical venues this is the seating capacity of the largest venue.
Show revenues in theatres are the price of tickets multiplied by the audience. I
use the average price if multiple ticket prices are reported. For TV shows I collect
price data from rate cards. Such cards specify the price for sponsorship of a show at a
local station, which allows me to compute the price charged for a TV show. From the
price per show I can compute a price per TV viewer, analogue to a ticket price, which
quantiﬁes the marginal return to reaching one more customer. Price data is only
available for a subset of observations. I infer prices based on a data from TV station
ad-pricing in 1956 and theater ticket prices in 1919. I use them to estimate a demand
elasticity for TV audiences, taking the supply of TV hours as given. The demand
curve for a TV viewer is estimated as: ln(price) = 4.051+−0.460∗ln(TV households).
The negative elasticity indicates that, as expected, the marginal value of reaching
a household is declining. The negative demand elasticity in turn implies that TV
station revenues do not increase 1:1 with audience, the revenue elasticity is 0.54.
The potential audience of TV shows is the number of TV households that can
watch a local TV station. This is computed using information on TV signal catchment
areas (from Fenton and Koenig, 2018) and TV ownership records from the Census.
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10.3.7 Controls
Control variables are: share non white, male, high skilled (high school and above for
people over 25) and median age and wage. Most variables are available consistently
throughout the sample period. Income and education are only available from 1940
onwards. The race variable as has changing categories and varying treatment of
mixed race individuals. I use the IPUMS harmonized race variable that corrects for
those ﬂuctuations were possible.
10.3.8 IRS Taxable Income Tables
Data from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) allows me to extend income data
backward beyond what is feasible with the Census.49 To obtain records for entertain-
ers, I digitize a set of taxable income tables that lists income brackets by state and
occupation. The breakdown of the data by occupation and state is only available for
the year 1916.
49Such tax tables have been used by Kuznets and Piketty to construct time series of top income
shares for the US population.
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10.4 APPENDIX: TABLES & FIGURES
Figure 9: Superstar Wage Distribution
wage
percentile
1
α
α′
Note: Wages based on a superstar model (wp = pi · κ · (1 − p)−(αγ−β)). α is the shape parameter of the
market size distribution (α′ > α). The percentiles shown are the upper tail of the wage distribution. With
exit they correspond to the percentiles in the pre-distribution.
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Figure 10: Eﬀect of Technical Change on Wage Distribution - Skill Biased Demand
Model
w
ag
e
.7 1
percentile
pre TV
post TV
[Note] The figure shows the wage distribution above the 70th percentile. The talent distribution has
been chosen to match the 1940 wage distribution. The change in the skill premium matches the
growth in the share of top earners.
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Figure 11: The Impact of Superstar Eﬀects on Top Earner
wage
percentile
1
wUS1%
E′
1% E1%
∆E1%
α
α′
[Note] Details as in figure 9. wUS1% is a wage threshold that defines a top earner, e.g. the national top
percentile. E1% and E
′
1%
are the share of entertainers above the threshold. ∆E1% is the change in top
earners when market size becomes more dispersed (move from α to α′).
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Figure 12: Theatre Seating Capacity
[Note] Performance venues are the venues listed in Julius Cahn-Gus Hill’s 1921 theatrical guide. Size refers
to the average seating capacity of the largest venues in the commuting zone.
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Figure 13: P95-P50 Gap
[Note] Figure reports the ratio of wages at the 95th and median. Percentiles are from the wage distribution
reported in the US decennial Census for the lower 48 states.
Figure 14: Top Income Percentile Values
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[Note] The Figure shows the top code cut-off in the US Census data and top percentiles of the wage
distribution in the Census years. The name in the legend refers to the sourcee of the wage distribution:
Census refers to percentiles in the Census data wage distribution, Entertainer to percentile in the
distribution of entertainer wages in the Census, Piketty to the data reported in the World Top Income
Database, top code is the top code in the IPUMS Census data – there is no top code for the 1939 full
count Census data. The number in the bracket in the legend indicatees the percentile of the distribution
that is shown.
68
Figure 15: Dynamic Treatment Eﬀect of TV stations - Placebo Occupations
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[Note] The figure shows regression coefficients from the dynamic difference in difference regression for
placebo occupations. Reported are the coefficients on local TV antennas and 95% confidence bands are
shown. Standard errors are clustered at the local labor market level.
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Figure 16: Quantile Eﬀects of Television
[Note] Each dot is based on separate quantile regression. The quantile regressions control for local labor
market and year fixed effect. I use the technique developed in Chetverikov, Larsen, and Palmer, 2016 to
do so. This amounts to calculating percentiles for each year-labor market observation and regressing those
percentiles on the treatment. The first step uses the provided sample weights, while the second weights by
cell size. If the top code bites for the analyzed percentiles, the cell is discarded. The dashed line represents
the benchmark prediction of a skill biased demand model.
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Table 9: Summary Statistics
observation mean s.d.
Television
Local TV Stations 2,888 0.02 0.25
Local Filming Cost 2,888 0.14 1.36
Show Audience (thsd.) 2,656 72,811 66,719
Show Revenue (thsd. $) 2,656 4,182,516 3,834,174
TV Signal (%) 2,888 60 0.49
Entertainment
Employment in Leisure Activities 2,888 2,468 8,540
Employment in Performance
Entertainment
2,888 177 936
Wage 99th Percentile of
Entertainers ($)
1,435 5,704 4,576
Fair Visits (thsd.) 8,664 25 109
Fair Ticket Receipts (thsd. $) 8,664 2.94 1.89
Show Receipts (thsd. $) 8,664 1.64 0.97
Rides & Carnival Receipts (thsd.
$)
8,664 0.92 7.50
Demographics
People (thsd.) 2,888 229 658
Worker (thsd.) 2,888 86 264
Median Income ($) 2,887 1,698 747
Population Density 2,888 2.5 7.8
Urban (%) 2,888 17 37
Minority (%) 2,888 9.6 13
Male (%) 2,888 50 2
Age 2,888 27.4 3.27
[Note] The table reports summary statistics for the 722 commuting zones over 4 decades. The data is
decadal, except Fair data which is annual data 1946-1957. Show audience and revenue refers to the largest
feasible shows in a CZ (see text for details), no data available for some CZs. Median income is missing in
one CZ in 1940. Variables Urban Share and Filming Cost are held fixed throughout the sample. Source:
US Census 1940-1970, Billboard magazine 1946-1956
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Table 10: Eﬀect of TV on Top Earner - Placebo Occupations
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: ln( Wage at 99th Percentile)
Local TV
station
0.023 0.019 0.016
(0.004) (0.003) (0.005)
Outcome mean 9.08 9.08 9.08
Eﬀect size 2.3% 1.9% 1.6%
Panel B: Share of Occupation in US Top 1% (ptp)
Local TV
station
0.21 0.66 1.09
(0.52) (0.89) (0.52)
Outcome mean 5.55 5.55 5.55
Eﬀect size 4% 12% 20%
Panel C: Local Population Share in US Top 1% (in 10,000)
Local TV
station
0.438 0.524 0.865
(0.221) (0.234) (0.319)
Outcome mean 10.86 10.86 10.86
Eﬀect size 4% 5% 8%
Cluster 722 722 722
Demographics – Yes –
Local labor
market trends
– – Yes
[Note] Each cell is the regression coefficient of a separate regression. Panel A uses a quantile regression
for within group treatment Chetverikov, Larsen, and Palmer, 2016. For this procedure data is aggregated
at the treatment level and uses 2,887 local labor market - year observations. Observations are weighted
by cell-size, cells where 99th percentile cannot be computed are dropped. Panel B and C use a difference
in difference regression and are based on respectively 62,042 and 62,746 observations at the occupation-
local labor market - year level. The treatment is the number of TV stations in the local area. Reported
baseline outcomes are the average of the dependent variable in treated areas in years without treatment. All
regressions control for local labor market fixed effects, time fixed effects, local production cost of filming in
years after 1956, in Panel B and C additionally for year - occupation fixed effects. The sample period spans
1940-1970. Demographics are median age, % female, % black, population density and trends for urban areas.
The outcome variable in Panel B is the share of top paid entertainers calculated as described in the text,
Panel C is the number of top paid entertainer devided by the population in a local labor market. Entertainer
are Actors, Athletes, Dancers, Entertainers Not Elswhere Classified, Musicians. Observations are weighted
by local labor market population. Standard errors are reported in brackets, they are clustered at the local
labor market level.
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Table 11: Eﬀect of TV on Top Earner - Alternative Top Income Measures
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Count Entertainer in US top 1%
Local TV
station
30.91 32.09 19.31
(8.92) (9.92) (8.31)
Outcome mean 15.53 15.53 15.53
Panel B: Share Entertainer in US top 1% (denominator fixed)
Local TV
station
6.51 6.73 9.21
(1.90) (1.89) (3.44)
Outcome mean 6.39 6.39 6.39
Panel C: Percent US top 1% from Entertainment
Local TV
station
0.178 0.193 0.194
(0.025) (0.038) (0.063)
Outcome mean 0.28 0.28 0.28
Cluster 722 722 722
Demographics – Yes –
Local labor
market trends
– – Yes
[Note] See table 1 Panel B denominator is the average number of entertainers per labor market in occupation
o at time t. Denominator in Panel C is the total number of entertainers in local labor market c at time t.
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Table 12: Alternative Top Income Measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Share in US top 1% Count top 1% Share in top 5%
Local TV station 90.19 132.5 30.91 31.64 120.0
(26.25) (35.92) (8.92) (16.36) (47.85)
threshold Census Piketty & Saez Census Entertainer Entertainer
(1940)
mean outcome 94.27 109.09 18.39 150.02 372.10
% growth 96% 121% 168% 21% 32%
[Notes] Different thresholds for top earners: column (1) top 1% in overall distribution based on Census wage,
(2) top 1% in overall distribution based on Piketty and Saez, 2003 (3) count of entertainer in top percentile,
(4) 95th percentile of entertainer wage distribution, (5) 95th percentile of entertainer in 1940. Source: Data
US Census and Piketty & Saez. Specification and sample same as baseline
Table 13: Eﬀect of TV on Top Earner - Micro Data
Probability in Top 1%
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TV × Performance Entertainer 0.74 0.76 0.79 0.79
(0.23) (0.26) (0.36) (0.22)
TV × Interactive Leisure -0.49
(0.34)
TV × Drink & Dine -0.65
(0.48)
TV × Professional Services 0.32
(0.21)
TV × Medics -1.54
(0.60)
TV × Engineer -0.09
(0.26)
TV × Manager 0.43
(0.28)
Location & Occupation-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographics – Yes – Yes
Local labor market trends – – Yes –
[Notes] The outcome is a dummy that takes the value 100 if an individual is in the top 1% in the US
distribution. Columns 1-3 are based on 83,748 individuals and column 4 on 3,438,002 individuals. Placebo
occupations are non affected free time professions: drink & dining and active leisure and typical high
pay professions: management, medicine, engineering, professional services (finance, accounting, law). The
number of observations are 100308. Regressions use provided Census weights and cluster by local labor
market.
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Table 14: Eﬀect of TV on Top Earner - State Level
Share in Top 1%
(1) (2) (3)
Local TV station (1940) -9.62
(5.95)
Local TV station (1950) 20.94 20.18 -2.98
(8.09) (7.36) (1.79)
Local TV station (1960) -9.95
(6.17)
Local TV station (1970) -13.33
(8.07)
Years 1940-1970 1916-1970 1916-1970
Observations 912 1008 1008
[Notes] Data US Census (1940-1970 and IRS in 1916. The regressor is the number of TV stations in 1950
in the state, allowing for time varying effects. In column 3 the omitted year is 1916. Standard errors are
clustered at the state level.
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Table 15: Earning Eﬀect - triple diﬀ
Share in Top 1%
(1) (2) (3)
TV × Placebo Occupation -0.41
(0.47)
TV × Performance Entertainer 4.87 4.87 4.17
(2.16) (2.16) (1.57)
TV × Interactive Leisure -3.40
(1.29)
TV × Drink & Dine -3.80
(1.84)
TV × Professional Services 5.23
(4.86)
TV × Medics -3.24
(1.52)
TV × Engineer -1.12
(1.23)
TV × Manager 3.55
(2.21)
Location & Occupation-Year FE Yes Yes –
Pairwise Interaction: Location, Year, Occupation FE – – Yes
[Notes] Data and specification are as in 1. Placebo occupations are non affected free time professions:
drink & dining and active leisure and typical high pay professions: management, medicine, engineering,
professional services (finance, accounting, law). The number of observations are 100,308.
Table 16: Quantile Eﬀect of TV
Wage Percentiles
99th 95th 75th 50th
Local TV station 260.3 85.00 22.33 19.13
(92.23) (3412.5) (445.3) (101.2)
[Notes] The reported coefficients are estimates using the quantile estimator for
within group transformation developed in Powell (2016).
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Table 17: Small Sample Performance of Pareto Shape Parameter Estimators
Estimator sample 10% local 5%
sample
True 0.460 0.460
OLS 0.558 0.715
MLE 0.617 0.629
MLE (top code) 0.640 0.618
Close to cut-oﬀ 0.478 0.480
The true 1/α is the value implied by the top 5% income share.
The simulation draws samples from the entertainer wage distri-
bution in the 1940 US full count Census. The samples are top
coded at the 99th percentile of the distribution. Column 1 fits
estimators on 10% samples dropping observations in the bottom
half of the sample. Column 2 draws a smaller sample equivalent
to a 5% sample of local labor markets. Estimates that imply an
infinite mean are discarded (α < 1)
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